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A REVIEW OF POLICIES IMPINGING ON THE 
INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS (ICM) 
IN THE PHILIPPINES* 
by 
Meliza H. Agabin** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
About one-third of the Philippine population of voting age 
borrow. Of this, two-third's do so from informal sources, which 
supply about 60 percent of all loans obtained by the borrowers. 
These global data taken from the surveys of the Social Weather 
Stations (SWS)-Ateneo University show that the informal credit 
market (ICM) is pervasive in both urban and rural locations and 
across economic classes. Other studies also suggest that 
Informal credit is similarly important in the peripheral and 
informal as well as the formal sectors of the economy. 
* This is part of a larger study conducted by the Social 
We a ther Stations on the informal credit markets in the 
Philippines, supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
through the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). 
The assistance of Dr. Joseph Lim (U.P. School of Economics), Dr. 
Mario B. Lamberte (PIDS) and Dr. Mahar K. Mangahas (Social 
Weather Stations) are gratefully acknowledged. Mis. Luisa Bote 
provided research assistance. 
** Fellow, Social Weather Stations, Inc. 
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The country's financial market is composed of•the formal and 
informal segments (Table 1). The role and primacy of the latter 
are not, however, at present captured in the country's statistics 
on the financial markets, which reflect only the data from formal 
institutions. Hence, how the economic performance and policies 
affect the behavior and performance of the ICM are not exactly 
known, except for a few fragmented pieces of evidence. 
This paper reviews the monetary and credit policies that 
directly or indirectly bear on the rise and fall of the ICM, and 
describes the responses of the formal financial sector %o the 
challenges of the informal sector and/or the opportunities in the 
financial markets. 
The paper is divided into five parts. A description of the 
Philippine financial structure, formal and informal, is presented 
in Part II. Then, a discussion of the legal and policy framework 
affecting the financial riarkets is made in Part III to give a 
historical perspective and more detailed discussion of selected 
monetary and credit measures, in the context of broad economic 
developments, and their effects on formal credit decline. Part 
IV presents the responses of the formal sector to the monetary 
measures and challenges of the ICM along with the tendencies 
exhibited by the informal credit markets. Finally, the fifth 
part contains the concluding notes. 
Lacking consistent time series data on the ICM, we have 
taken an approach that is basically descriptive and indirect. 
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We looked at the major policies that influenced the expansion or 
contraction of the formal financial sector covering the period 
1970 to early 1987. Bank data were used to indicate directions 
of growth. 
Existing surveys and studies were utilized extensively. 
Interviews with bankers and Central Bank officials were also 
conducted to enlighten us the formal-informal linkages and the 
operations of money shops. For this purpose, four officers of 
three commercial banks, three officers of two rural banks, two 
officers of money shops, and two officers of the Central Bank 
were interviewed. 
The review of policies is undertaken within the broader 
framework depicted in Figure 1, on the assertion that the ICM is 
not isolated from the effects of the policies and performance of 
the real, fiscal, and foreign sectors. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
The financial markets' dualism in the country is reflected 
in the existence of a relatively well-established formal sector 
with a parallel informal financial market. To define the scope 
of the informal financial markets, we have to define the scope of 
the formal sector. The latter is often synonymous with 
institutions and related arrangements which are registered with 
an authorized supervisory agent of the government. In the 
Philippine context, and for the purpose of this study, the formal 
financial sector includes all institutions which are under the 
Supervisory and regulatory authority of or are reporting to the 
Central Bank of the Philippines (CB). 
The Philippine financial system is best viewed in a 
continuum rather than as a rigid dichotomy between the formal 
sector and the informal one. At one end of the spectrum is an 
extremely formal and sophisticated Structure, which serves the 
corporate market and has links to the domestic and international 
capital markets; examples of these are the universal banks, 
commercial banks, and finance companies. At the other extreme is 
a very loose, highly personal-based system of individual lenders 
where loan transactions may not carry interest charges nor even 
be recorded, and may take place as part of a survival or coping 
strategy of the borrowers. In between are substructures that 
mimic some features of the parallel system. In the formal system 
we find money shops, pawnshops, lending investors, and rural 
banks in the small deposits and/or small loans market. These 
institutions have the ability to adapt to the ways of the 
informal lenders - quick and simple processing, daily collection, 
personal contact. Their lending rates are also generally higher 
than normal bank rates. 
On the other hand, certain ICM substructures partake ot tne 
features of the formal financial intermediary: they mobilize 
deposits, they have an organizational set up, standard rules and 
regulations, bookkeeping systems, and a place to transact 
business in. These are the credit cooperatives (or credit 
unions) and their federations, as well as other informally 
organized groups, including those which function as lending 
investors. Some of the credit cooperatives have capacities for 
lending bigger loans on the longer end and the structures have 
evolved their own "central banking" facilities (NRECA, 1987). 
The Formal Financial System 
Figure 2 shows the Structure of the formal financial sector. 
Monetary regulations and supervision by the CB over this system 
extend over a wide range of areas - from entry and exit to 
qualifications of officers, banking days and hours, 
capitalization, reserve requirements against deposits, interest 
rates, loanable resource allocation, maintenance of financial 
ratios (e.g., risk to assets and past due ratios), branchinig, 
services and allied activities which financial institutions can 
engage in, and reporting requirements. The Central Bank 
exercises visitorial powers over them. Regulatory supervision 
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isf however, not uniformly applied across all types of financing 
institutions. Some, like banks, are closely regulated by the CB: 
others are less regulated (like pawnshops) or virtually 
unregulated, as in the case of lending investors. 
Excluding the CB and the insurance system, the total assets 
of the formal financial sector amounted to #331.6 billion (Table 
1) by the end of 1986. This is 54 percent of the nominal value 
of GNP for that year. It has a network of outlets that has 
expanded satisfactorily since the 1950s, but which remains urban-
oriented. It has two major substructures -- banks and the non-
bank financial intermediaries {NBFlis) . Banks must be 
incorporated entities registered with the Securities and Excl^nge 
Commission, while NBFIs can be a person or entity licensed and/or 
registered with:any government regulatory body. 
Banks. The commercial banks (KBs) , including nine universal 
banks, dominate the whole system - in assets, presence, 
deposits, and loans. Their loan portfolio is preponderantly made 
up of collateralized loans (over 65%) for large corporate 
borrowers (over 701), most of which have several other linked 
businesses with the banks * The significant physical presence of 
the KBs has been due to branching expansion. In the countryside, 
K B b r a n c h e s are mainly deposit takers conduiting funds therefrom 
to the industrial sector and urb^n locations (TBAC, 1985). Some 
commercial banks are given the authority to invest, own, and 
operate allied undertakings* such as finance companies and other 
financial intermediaries other than a commercial bank. A few 
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commercial banks operate money shops which are engaged in 
servicing small loans and deposits in or close to public market 
places. 
Within the banking structure, the small unit countryside 
banks, otherwise commonly known as the rural banks, have been 
important in the small loans and deposits market principally in 
the rural areas. Rural banking was an innovation adopted in the 
1950s as a response to the challenges posed by the problems of 
agrarian~ unrest and the perception that informal lending 
practices contributed to such unrest. Although the RB system's 
resources are small compared to the total, their large number of 
outlets have reached more number of clientele in the countryside 
than any other bank. The RB system had been a major agent in 
channeling government funds to the rural sector especially in the 
1970s when the government funded various lending programs. 
Non-Bankt Financ_ial_ Intgrmediar ies. The non-bank financial 
intermediaries comprise a tenth of the resources and one-fifth of 
the total loans of the entire formal financial system. Among 
the private NBFIs, the most dominant ones in terms of their share 
in the total resources and loans from the subsector are the 
investment companies, investment houses, and financing companies. 
Pawnshops and lending investors (Lis) are the important ones 
in the small loans market. It requires only a minimum capital 
of 7100,000 to set up one. Pawnshops have mushroomed all over 
extending micro loans on the basis of pawns, usually pieces of 
jewelry and other articles of value, often for emergency needs of 
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households and individuals. Pawnshops are required to set up 
shops wherein to conduct their business and to provide safety 
facilities for the Safekeeping of the pawns. 
Similarly, lending investors (Lis) provide relatively small 
loans, many on clean basis for business and consumption purposes 
to small firms, businesses, and wage employees. They are active 
in offices, public market places, and town centers where they 
extend loans to small bufeinefeSmgn under a daily collection 
scheme. In offices, they extend salary loans which are collected 
through payroll deduction or by a collector who makes the regular 
rounds on paydays. They have very simple operations and employ 
1 / 
2-5 people. 
As of end 1987, the average resources of an LI were less 
than a million pesos (^772,686), while the average loan volume 
was about ?600,000. Majority (74%) of the 443 Lis which 
registered with the CB toward the end of 1987 are under single 
proprietorship? 25 percent are corporations, and 1 percent, 
partnership. 
In a way, Lis are a crossbreed of sort. They operate like 
the non-stock savings and loan associations (NSSLAS), which is 
another type of non-bank financing institution* except that Lis 
can go to other offices to extend loans. NESLAs loans are 
limited to member's only. 
An officer of the CB-Department of Financial 
Intermediaries relayed the observation to this author that a 
number of informal money lenders have registered with the CB as 
lending investors. They may have been encouraged to do so by the 
liberalization of the financial policy on interest rates. 
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Virtually unregulated, the only requirements imposed by the 
CB on lending investors are a minimum paid-in capital of 
?100,000, the submission of the quarterly financial statements 
and annual reports, and the biodata of officers. To register 
with the CB, only the submission of the organizational papers is 
necessary, while only a municipal license is needed in the case 
of single proprietorship. The CB merely acknowledges receipt of 
requirements. Lis are not audited by the CB, either. 
Pawnshops and Lis both expanded after interest rates were 
deregulated and very rapidly when the credit from the financial 
system became very tight and expensive during the period 1984-
1987. 
The NBFIs are not allowed to mobilize deposits from the 
general public. They can only raise funds from less than 20 
lenders. However, duly incorporated NBFIs may be allowed to 
perform quasi-banking functions. By this, they can borrow, 
obtain, or raifee funds from 20 or more lenders in the money 
market for the purpose of relending or purchasing receivables 
and other obligations. Financing companies became quite popular 
as an alternative place to invest surplus funfls in the 1960s 
because they could offer higher returns than bank3 on investors' 
savings. The competitive edge of the financing companies and the 
like had waned with the full liberalization of interest rates in 
the early 1980s. Financing companies also suffered -some reverses 
in recent years; a number of them were closed down by the CB. 
Their resources and loans had been declining substantially since 
1984 (Table 2). 
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The Informal Credit Markets 
Figure 3 depicts the ICM structure in terms of the degree of 
intermediation functions performed by the lenders, their major 
sources of funds, and linkage with other markets. 
The ICM is first and foremost a reflection of the extended 
family system and social structure where kinship, friendship, and 
other personal ties rest at the foundation of the market. 
Popular sources were and continue to be relatives and friends 
(Table 3) . Indeed, farm sector landlord credit, which supplied 
about one-fourth of farm credit from informal sources in the 
early 1960s is by and large based on personal and social 
relationships. Even the "suki" system whereby one continues to 
patronize a supplier of credit although costs may be lower 
elsewhere, reflects the personal ties of the parties which 
develop over time. 
ICM_ Suppliers; _ Si ze_ an d_ Some _Charac ter is tics . Nobody knows 
the total number of informal lenders, who are known to be a very 
heterogeneous lot. With the exception of credit cooperatives, 
ICM lenders are not registered with government authorities. There 
is free entry and exit into the market. Informal lenders conduct 
their business generally unfettered by any governmental 
regulations or reporting requirements on their lending 
transac tions. 
A broad segment of the ICM suppliers belong to the organized 
sector whose main businesses are registered with proper 
government authorities like the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission, the National Food Authority, and the like. Examples 
of these are found in the agricultural sector as well as in the 
industrial and services sectors, such as the poultry industry 
integrators, millers, traders, input dealers, shoe manufacturers, 
and overseas recruitment agencies. These licensed individuals 
and enterprises appear as a dominant segment of the ICM. Credit 
is made to their bulwark of clientele whose economic activities 
are tied up with the lenders' major economic interests. Lending 
or giving advances —in-kind or in-cash — is an essential 
component integrated into their main line of business. This is 
to assure themselves either of the market for their produce or a 
supply of raw materials for their trade, or both. 
In rural farming areas, linked arrangements are quite 
popular. Traders provide advances to farmers with prospects of 
payment from a forthcoming harvest. This is a form of informal 
contract growing arrangement. Within the formal sector of the 
economy, more formalized parallel system is exemplified in the 
poultry growing industry. Here, corporate industry integrators 
have been important in the supply of loans to their contract 
broiler growers. Integrators are engaged in the manufacture of 
inputs (chickens, feeds, etc.); production of broilers through 
their network of contract growers; marketing; and processing of 
the same. They provide loans in kind to contract growers and 
absorb the latter's prociuce for payment as stipulated under a 
formal and legally binding contract. 
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The dominant suppliers of informal loans nonetheless vary 
according to the important economic activity of the locale. Such 
dominance is readily apparent in the countryside. Years after 
the implementation of nationwide agrarian reform in rice 
producing areas, richer farmers, palay traders, and millers have 
become the most important lenders (TBAC, 1986; Floro, 1986). 
Coconut traders are the major ones in coconut producing areas 
where harvesting and trading take place every 45 days (Geron, 
1988) . 
Farmers who are into trading and post-harvest services have 
become one of the major suppliers of credit in farming 
communities. Floro also suggests that additional access to land 
either by acquisition or under usufruct arrangements is a 
principal motivation to the farmer-lenders, thus linking the 
credit market with the land market. 
Following our earlier distinction between what is formal and 
informal, it can be said that the government is also an informal 
lender (see Figure 3). Some non-financial governmental entities 
perform lending functions outside the purview of the monetary 
authorities. These informal lending activities are usually made 
as a component strategy of programs which they implement to reach 
target groups who often do not have access to bank credit. 
Lending is more often an ad hoc activity. It is governed by 
rules and regulations formulated by the agency. Some programs of 
lending utilized banks as agents. Such lending proliferated in 
13 
the 1970s, abetted by the availability of treasury funds and 
2/ 
external grants and loanis. 
The density of ICM lenders relative to population can be 
gathered from micro level studies of communitiels and farming 
villages. The number of informal lenders to population would 
seem to be higher than that of the formal system. It must be 
stressed, however, that the lending resources of the informal 
lenders are much smaller and that not all those who lend any 
amount of value are in the market as regular commercial lenders 
motivated by profits. 
Two indicators of the latter are disclosed by the isize of 
non-interest loans and by the number of commercial lenders. Non-
interest bearing loans are relatively large, reaching up to 25 
percent of informal loans in rural locale (!see Sacay, et.al., 
1985) . 
In terms of the number of commercial lenders, a number of 
studies shed light on this. Lamberte and Bunda (1987) found a 
total of 43 sources of informal credit in the community of Sapang 
Palay, a resettlement area in the fringes of Metro Manila. Ten 
(10) were rotating savings and credit associations or 
paluwagans, while 33 were other types of infofmal lenders. Of 
2 / 
Examples of the informal lender-agencies of the 
government are the Departments of Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, 
Trade and Industry, Social Services and Development, Labor and 
Employment, the Technology Resource Center, and the National 
Electrification Administration. 
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the latter, only 20 or about two-thirds were professional 
lenders. A. Mangahas (1987), in her data of sources of loans of 
overseas contract workers, also revealed that Only two-thirds of 
the 12 lenders investigated were regular money lenders. 
Geron's study of eight (8) rural villages likewise disclosed 
that between 59 and 79 informal lenders were servicing borrowers 
in relatively developed villages. In undeveloped villages, the 
range was between 11 and 63 informal lenders. However, this 
study did not isolate those lending for commercial profit. 
ICM Funds SourceS. Lending intermediated funds (deposits) 
i3 an exception rather than the rule and inheres only in the case 
of credit cooperatives and ROSCAS. By and large, there are 
informal lenders who rely mainly on internal funds while 
borrowings are resorted to principally by those with linked 
businesses. 
Recent case studies point to greater reliance on own savings 
to support small scale lending operations. A. Mangahas (1987) 
reports this to be in all the 12 cases of informal lenders 
lending to overseas workers. A. Lava (1987) confirms this 
reliance on own savings in the case of all the individual lenders 
she investigated. Lava examined 24 informal lenders, which 
included 20 individual lenders, a credit cooperative; two (2) 
organized foundations and a ROSCA. Only the latter three (3) 
categories sourced their loanable funds from deposits of members 
(credit coop & ROSCA) and fund drives or donations (foundations). 
Only one (1) case of bank borrowing was reported by an individual 
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lender. This reliance on own savings partly defines the limited 
size and scope of their lending operations. 
Those informal lenders belonging to the formal sector of the 
i 
economy have access to bank funds. More on this aspect will be 
discussed in Section IV. 
Some informal lenders mobilize deposits, too, apart from the 
credit coop types. The mutual* help schemes known locally as 
paluwagans (Tagalog) and among (Ilocano) are forms of credit 
cooperatives or rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAS). A group of persons turn in the same amount of money 
towards a common fund and then take turns in using the amount 
collected. Deposits do not earn interest, but they serve the 
purpose of providing each member of the group with larger funds 
to meet extraordinary needs. 
Cases of individual lenders raising deposits and/or equity 
contributions from others are disclosed by recent studies. 
Lamberte and Bunda found a lender who was mobilizing and paying 
very high interest rates (80% per annum) on deposits in a 
depressed community. 
Other lenders operate like pawnshops, accepting as security 
pieces of jewelry, land titles, and other articles of value. 
These lenders, -in effect, provide facilities for liquefying 
assets. Others operate like discount windows where checks are 
offered as collateral (Son, 1986; Lamberte & Jose, 1988). 
Sizei of ^ Demand for ICM^redit. whether in rural or urban 
areas, in the poor or nori-poor sectors of Philippine society, 
the ICM has a wide reach of clientele. A number of separate 
nationwide surveys at the household level in the 1980s give an 
idea of this. For instance, TBAC (1986) reported that 29.2 
percent of 2.1 million small farm households were borrowers in 
crop year 1981-82. Of the borrowers, 60 percent got their loante 
from the ICM. The National Economic and Development Authority 
(NEDA, 1987) reported some 13.3 percent of 25.9 million low 
income population (bottom 30%) were borrowers anytime between 
1975 to 1985. seventy-nine percent (79%) of these were ICM 
borrowers (see Table 4). 
In 1986, 32.2 percent of the 29.8 million persons of voting 
age indicated that they have borrowed money for income generating 
activities, with 65 percent of them going to the informal 
creditors (SWS-Ateneo, October 1986). 
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With a somewhat different question, the SWS-Ateneo 
survey in October 1987 disclosed almost the same proportions: 
34.5 percent were borrowers in the past 12 months, and 66 percent 
of them from informal sources. By amount of loans taken, 
borrowings from the ICM totaled to ?26.5 billiori , or 59 percent 
out of ?45.0 billion loans from all sources (Table 4a). From 
either the formal or informal credit markets, the bulk of the 
"" The question: In the past 12 months, did the family 
borrow at least ?1,000? The 1986 survey did not specify the 
amount. 
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borrowers obtained loans below P12,500 (formal, 83.0%; informal, 
93.0%). Formal loans averaged P5,225 while informal borrowings 
averaged 94,039. 
If the 1987 SWS-Ateneo survey data were disaggregated by 
locale, more rural than urban borrowers significantly go to the 
ICM (Table 5). The data further Show that by wealth status, 
close to 60 percent of those borrowers who rated themselves 
"Poor" or in the borderline of poverty go to inormal lenders as 
against 47 percent of those who rated themselves "Not Poor." 
The poorest in the SWS-Ateneo surveys are found to have the least 
access to formal credit. In proportion to the population in the 
economic class, 33 percent of the poorest class borrow (rich to 
middle income group - 30%; poor - 32%), but significantly more of 
them (1986 - 75%; 1987 - 77%) borrow from the informal Sources. 
In the Philippine context, the foregoing dat& signify the 
importance of developing institutional capacities to cater to the 
small loans markets and of exercising caution in limiting the 
capacity of the ICM suppliers to lend through legislative 
measures (Such as setting a limit on the interest rates of small 
loans). Such measures are bound to hurt the poor more. 
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III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
Significant events and policies in the Philippine economic 
and socio-political spheres between 1970 and 1987 are summarized 
in Table 6. The long march toward financial liberalization is 
highlighted, along with the fiscal and foreign sector 
developments. 
The period covered by this review (1970-1987) was marked by: 
a) many years of generally expansionary credit from financing 
institutions with high growths in 1975 and 1978; b) highly 
contractionary credit in 1984 and 1985; and c) reforms that 
completed the process of liberalizing the financial system by 
early 1980s. 
Table 7 summarizes the direction of major (monetary policies 
and credits from banks. The general direction of formal credit 
are captured below from the data of real rediscounts and advanced 
from the CB and real loans of banks, alorig with the mix of 











The plus sign indicates expansion; minus, contractionary 
direction. 
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To appreciate the events which influenced the contractionary 
and expansionary movements of formal credit and the ensuing 
policy changes,, the perspectives of history and the legal policy 
milieu would be helpful. 
From a historical perspective, it may be said that monetary 
and credit policies were partly a product of the biases against 
informal money lenders and usurious practices. These biases had 
long been enshrined in a number of legislations in the country. 
Institutions were created to confront the "eradication" of 
informal lenders or, more modestly, provide alternative sources 
* • 
of credit to the broader masses of the population. Laws against 
usurious lending practices have been in the statutes since 1916. 
Nowhere was the goal of supplanting or diminishing the 
influence of informal lenders more fiercely directed than in the 
rural areas. This was because of the perception that usurious 
practices that were tied to the feudal system contributed to a 
restive countryside. 
The Philippine government's efforts to improve the access of 
the population to formal sources of credit had resulted in a 
supply-led policy agenda. Over at least the past three (3) 
decades, the policy mix had included the creation of new 
financial institutions under government control, and the priming 
up of formal lending by providing fundfc and guarantees under a 
regime of controlled interest rates. This policy track, though, 
had fepelt a strong state presence and subsidies to maintain the 
program. 
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The interest Rates Policy 
A number of legislations pegged intterest rates on loans from 
any source at certain levels. This provided a very rigid and 
inflexible policy framework. The law with the longest tenure, 
the Anti-Usury Law of 1916, set the tone by making it unlawful 
for anyone to charge interest above 14 percent On unsecured, and 
12 percent on secured loans. 
The Usury Law was virtually repealed in 1973 when the 
country's monetary authority was granted the power to revise the 
administrative ceilings on interest rates. This act marked the 
transition period toward full fledged financial liberalization. 
The policy of regulated rates.wais completely abandoned in 1981 
when the "package of financial reforms adopted a floating rate 
policy. 
The policy regimenting interest rates had been a ma^or 
factor which contributed to the repressed and underdeveloped 
Philippine financial system. It had a negative effect on savers, 
thus slowing domestic mobilization of intermediated funds. It 
also limited the ability of banks to reach out beyond corporate 
clientele and big loans due to considerations of administration 
and risk costs. For instance, over the period 1970-1986, real 
rates of interest on bank deposits and loans were negative for 
most years (see Tables 8 and 9). Positive real rates on loans 
were achieved beginning 1981 after ratefe became market-oriented 
with the real spreads also positive. The exception wa3 1984; 
although nominal loan rates soared to about 40 percent, inflation 
rate was mutfh higher at 50 percent. 
21 
Building Institutional Capacities 
As late as the 1950s> laws creating the small unit rural 
banKs (RBs) and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing 
Administration (ACCFA) were enacted to expand access to 
institutional credit in the countryside. Corollarily, branching 
by bigger banks was alSo encouraged. 
Family-owned rural bank units were required only very small 
capital which the government matched on a 1:1 basis. By 
legislation, their scope of lending was limited to a group of 
clientele - the small farmers, defined as those with landholding 
of not not more than 50 hectares, and small businesses. More 
than 1,000 units were established over three (3) decades all 
over the country. Today, however, only some 895 operating units 
exist. More than half of them are in financial trouble due to a 
number of reasons, including policy-induced difficulties and high 
levels of arrears resulting from the system's participation in 
government-supported lending programs in the 1970s. 
On the other hand, the ACCFA, later known as the 
Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA), was set up as a 
government non-bank financial institution tasked with the putting 
up of a substructure consisting of multi-purpo&e agricultural 
cooperatives through which it could channel government credit 
funds. Over 800 of these were quickly established. But after a 
brief period, most of them folded up leaving a large portion of 
unpaid loan& behind. The ACA eventually bowed out of existence 
in 1982, with its former functions transferred to another 
government bank, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). 
The LBP was established in 1974 after the entire country's 
tenanted rice and corn landb were placed under agrarian reform. 
It is a specialized bank endowed with unibanking functions, but 
with a mandate to finance the agrarian reform program and address 
the withdrawal of landlord credit to farmers. Its record of 
support to the agrarian reform beneficiariefe has not been 
admirable due to various constraints (TBAC, 1985). Land Bank 
credit to the agricultural sector had comprised only- a very 
small portion of its total lending portfolio. 
Money shops were also authorized in the early 1970s by the 
Central Bank to be operated by banks .as the smallest unit of 
operation. Specifically they wouQ.d service public market vendors 
to countervail the high rates of interest from informal sources. 
A total of 177 money shops were established over the period 
1973-1983. Some 113 continued to operate as m6ney shops by the 
end of 1987. A few money Shops had to close for a number of 
i 
reasons whereas a good number became a staging point for 
exploring the market and establishing extension offices and/or 
branches. With the financial reforms of the 1980s, money shops 
became extension offices which can provide full banking services 
to their clientele* 
The initiative to build institutional capacities had also 
originated from the private sector. More as a response to the 
regimented rates on interest, non-bank financing institutions 
developed and became very active financial intermediaries. They 
offered alternative instruments to the public outside of the 
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purview of CB regulations and the Usury Law or the ceiling on 
interest rates. These institutions were, however, placed under 
the CB's regulatory authority in 1972. As earlier noted, a 
segment of the NBFIs comprise institutions that offer small loans 
to the public. 
Interventions on the Supply of Credit Funds 
The government employed several approaches to increase the 
supply of credit to the non-traditional clientele of banks and 
areas of investment which the government considered as priority. 
The rediscounting policies of the Central Bank played a key role 
here, along with fiscal policies allocating budgetary resources 
and external borrowings for special credit schemes, and forced 
allocation of credit resources which was imposed on all banks. 
Rediscounting Policy. A liberalized and expansionary 
rediscounting policy prevailed from 1974 up to the early 1980s 
(see Table 10 and Figure 5). The rediscounting window became a 
source of first, rather than last, resort and was utilized as an 
allocative mechanism by the government. 
Low cost funds were made widely available to banks for 
almost all types of investment areas identified as priority. 
The cost was lower than regular deposit rates. The rates on so-
called preferred areas were even much lower so that the banks can 
make loans which are administratively costly and risky at no more 
than the legal ceilings. 
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A multi-tiered rediscounting policy favoring certain areas 
and institutions was in effect until 1985 when a single uniform 
^market-directed rate, loan value, and ceiling on borrowings by 
banks wa» imposed on all types of loans and insti tut ions. 
Rediscount rates were as cheap as 1 to 3 percent for high 
priority areas of government, which included agriculture. For 
the less preferred areas, loan papers could be rediscounted by 
bankis at Somewhat higher rates. The gross spread between the 
rediscount rates and the prescribed lending rates to ena-uSers 
varied, but reached up to 9 to 12 percentage points in kmall 
loans programs. 
The borrowing limits of banks at the Central Bank rediscount 
window were also at preferential rates for particular types of 
banks. Rural banks were allowed to borrow up to four timed of 
their net worth plufc three times the average of their savings and 
time deposits to expand their lending capability in the rural 
areas. This made the system highly leveraged and dependent on 
the government. Encouraged by the liberal funding available from 
special programs, the RB system sourced up to more than 50 
percent of their loanable funds from the Central Bank 
particularly in the 1970s. Thife became a Source of trouble for 
many RBs later on so that a rehabilitation program had to be 
formulated in 1986 because more than half of the RB system had 
incurred high past due obligations with CB. 
The targeted lending-oriented policy at the CB rediscount 
window had aimed, among others, at the population with very low 
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access to institutional credit. The net effect of the policy, 
however, was more in favor of the relatively well off who could 
afford to take out regular bank loanfe even without subsidy. 
Indeed, the bulk of the rediscount availmentfe were obtained by 
commercial banks - not for those in the periphery of the economy, 
but for their usual corporate and fully secured loan& (Agabin, 
1986). 
The cheap credit policy also derailed the Savings 
mobilization of the rural banks as they became very dependent on 
government funds, and consequently fell into financial trouble 
when the rediscounting ground rules were changed in 1984 — from 
liberal access and cheap cost to very restricted and market-
oriented rates. The result had contributed to the drying up of 
formal credit to the small farming sector and a drift in the 
investment portfolio of rural banks to commercial, secured loans 
and securities. Securities became an attractive investment 
beginning 1983 at the expense of agriculture and industrial 
loans. 
Special^ Funding. Budgetary allocations and foreign 
borrowings alSo supported a multiplicity of government-initiated 
credit programs. More than six (6) billion peSo worth of 
treasury- and foreign-sourced funds were existing by mid-1987 for 
lending to various credit programs for agriculture. About 35 
different agricultural credit schemes were in place up to 1987 
under the so-called "supervised and special lending" umbrella. 
Under this, loan funds were made available through special funds 
26 
and the- Central Bank rediscount window at very low cofet; 
technically, the use of the fund and the application of a 
prescribed production technology were supposed to be "guided" by 
the government's agriculture extension agents. The biggest and 
more well-known was the Masagana 99 rice production lending 
program. The performance of agricultural lending programs, 
however, has been very disappointing. Most had very poor 
repaymen ts. 
Various funding schemes were also put into place for the 
small and medium industry sector, for the less privileged in 
general under the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK), for the 
landless rural workers under the sponsorship of the Department of 
Labor, and other's directed at specific types of clientele. In the 
1970s, the state-owned PNB also implemented special credit 
windows for small loans to market vendors and to overseas 
workers, but both windows were closed after discouraging 
exper iences. 
Special credit programs had been at best only temporary in 
nature, with few exceptions, these programs ended up with large 
unpaid loans. By the mid-1980s, credit program lending had 
waned. Most of the credit programs had either suspended lending, 
had phased out, or were lending only token sums. About half of 
those for agriculture were consolidated into the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) in 1987 for an all-risk credit 
guarantee facility. 
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Masagana 99 Credit Program. An elaboration of the Masagana 
99 (M-99) credit program at this point is being made for a number 
of reasons: a) Masagana 99 was the largest credit program in the 
countryside ever implemented by the government; b) it was able to 
reach about a third of the rice farmers and leaves a historical 
imprint in the farming villages and credit experience of farmers; 
c) it created a direct effect on the informal credit markets; and 
d) it triggered the problems which RBs find themselves in now. 
The existing policy, socio-economic, and political milieu 
before the launching of the program in May 1973 will help place 
the program in a proper perspective. 
The years immediately preceding the M-99 implementation 
were characterized by a number of significant events: 
a) contractionary monetary policy following a presidential 
election overspending in 1969; b) an unsettled socio-political 
climate that led to the imposition of martial rule in September 
1972, by the then President of the Republic, whose firfet actions 
included declaring that all rice and corn lands tenanted by some 
1.01 million farmers would be placed under land reform; c) 
natural calamities that reduced domestic food, specifically 
paddy, production at very low levels leading to long queues of 
rice consumers in the urban areas; on top of this* a global food 
5/ 
crisis made importation of grains a difficult task and 
y 
Before an international forum, the then Secretary of 
Agriculture Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. related the government's 
difficulties in negotiating for rice imports: "We scrounged all 
over to get the rice supply we needed from the international 
markets, we had the money and we were willing to pay cash. But 
we found it very hard to get the supply even from our usual 
suppliers." 
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propelled grains into a commodity of strategic and political 
significance in the international arena. At the Same time, 
however, a world export boom led to a large positive balance of 
payments (BOP) for the country and the biggest GNP growth in 
1973. 
MaSagana 99 aimed to increase paddy yields and bring the 
country to a level of self Sufficiency. The Philippines till 
then had been a perennial rice importer. A fertilizer-
responsive rice technology was available. The credit program 
could fund more farmers to adapt it. Thus, the network of rural 
banks and branches of the PNB were mobilized along with the 
government's agricultural extension force. Low cost special 
"seed" funds and rediscounts from the CB were opened up to 
participating banks. A loan guarantee Scheme was corollarily made 
to answer for any default due to natural calamities through the 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (AGF) scheme. Farmers could get 
their loans without the usual bank collateral. Incidentally, it 
came at a time when credit withdrawal from the landlords would 
create a vacuum in rice farm financing. 
Over its life span of 14 years, M-99 injected close to ^6.0 
billion loans to the predominantly small rice farmers in the 
countryside. Its scope of lending and coverage peaked during the 
first three (3) crop years. It was a downhill trend after as 
repayments deteriorated (Table 11; See also Figure 6). 
The program had been assessed as a very expensive experience, 
Although it helped achieve rice sufficiency earlier, it had 
produced Some adverse consequences on the participating banks 
(Sacay, et. al., 1985). Nevertheless, the influence of M-99 on 
formal credit access cannot be ignored. Program lending reached 
at least about a third of palay farmers at one time or another. 
TBAC, in a nationwide Survey of small farmers, found that about a 
third of the farmer's experienced borrowing from banks, of which 
Some 40 percent did so through M-99. The program substituted for 
Some informal credits for a time. When program lending declined, 
there was a Significant , but not wholesale, Shift back to 
informal SourceS. Among those who Stopped borrowing from bank's, 
four (4) out of ten (10) went back to the informal lenders (TBAC, 
1986). 
Credit Allocation Policy. In 1975, the law (PD 717) 
required all bank's to invest 25 percent of their net loanable 
funds generated to agriculture, Specifically, to the agrarian 
reform beneficiaries. Its enactment in 1975 was prompted by the 
Same economic environment and policy concerns — getting more 
funds to flow into the rural sector to support the agrarian 
reform program and food production recovery efforts - by getting 
the bigger banks into the act. PD 717 gave banks the option of 
direct lending or investing in government approved Securities. A 
corollary deposit retention policy was also implemented. This 
requires that 75 percent of deposits generated in the region 
should be invested therein. The idea waS to Stem the outflow of 
funds out of the rural areas. 
This wholesale attempt to increase the exposure of the 
banking system to agriculture had nil effect. The regional 
deposit retention scheme had not been effective either. In fact, 
the share of agriculture loans to the total loan portfolio even 
declined (Table 12). The other effect of the loan quota was to 
raise the cost of intermediation. This was because banks opted 
to put in a substantial portion (two-thirds) of their compliance 
to the agrarian credit quota in government securities, which 
earned less than alternative investments. The locked-in 
investments in securities served as an additional reserve which 
increased their intermediation costs (TBAC, 1985). 
CB_ bills for the countryside. Significant economic events 
characterized 1974. The country experienced the first oil shock 
leading to a negative current account balance and a dwindling 
BOP. The growth rates in domestic liquidity and inflation were 
very high (Table 13). At the same time, however, loans from the 
banking system had the highest growth rate; outstanding 
rediscounts of the CB also increased by over 150 percent. 
To siphon off excels liquidity in the system, the CB 
countryside bills (CBCls) were issued. The issuance of the CBCIs 
was actually made as a means to remove excess liquidity in the 
urban areas and to redirect funds to the countryside through the 
CB's rediscount window. Investment in the CteCIs was also made an 
option to comply with the credit quota policy and the securities 
were made reserve eligible. The phase out of CBCIs had begun 
only in recent years. 
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The 1980 Financial Reforms 
The financial reforms to finally liberalize the financial 
system and free the interest rates were approved by the then 
legislative assembly in 1980. The reforms were geared toward 
promoting efficiency in the system, under which financial 
institutions can provide a broader range of services and enhance 
domestic mobilization of long-term funds under a competitive 
atmosphere. 
The move emphasizing domestic generation of funds followed a 
regime of h.eavy borrowing from abroad which saddled the country 
with a huge foreign debt of some $28.0 billion by the end of 
1986. 
The financial reforms alSo removed enforced specialization 
and introduced universal banking. The reserve requirements were 
aliso programmed for reduction such that it would eventually be 
down to 16 percent by July 1982. This did not materialize, 
however. Instead, reserves were adjusted upwards Several times 
from September 1983 until they reached a high of 24 percent by 
April 1984 for commercial banks (refer to Table 7). 
Implementation of the reforms was caught in a Serious 
economic, financial, social, and political crises on the domestic 
front, and by severe recession abroad. The country's EOF 
worsened and was ^WFM^percent of GNP by 1983., Budget' deficit 
ballooned, reaching - 4.3 percent of GNP by 1982. (see Figure 8). 
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The financial crisis which started in 1981 resulted in the 
government's control of six (6) major bankfe, and an increased 
demand for financing by the government. By 1982, currency 
creation, an inflationary source, was funding the budget deficits 
up to 72 percent of domes tically-sourced funds. Fore'ign 
borrowings were funding up to 49 percent of the deficits in 1985. 
The government sector borrowings from deposit money banks alSo 
rose aS a consequence, thus reducing the available funds for 
private sector loans. 
The rise in reserve requirements waS part of the monetarist 
approach to address the critical BOP problems and the high 
liquidity in the- system. To further reduce base money and 
liquidity, the Central Bank virtually closed the rediscounting 
window and borrowed directly from the public and financial system 
from mid 1984 up to 1986. CB bills (known as "Jobo" bills) were 
sold at high interest rates that reached a high of 43 percent by 
October 1984. This tool proved to be a powerful and destructive 
intervention by the monetary authorities (Montes, 1987). By 
1985, gross domestic credits to CB by deposit money banks were 
more than double the 1983 level. 
The national government also borrowed heavily from the 
financial system to fund the budget deficits. High yield 
treasury bills were sold Since foreign Sources to finance 
budgetary deficits were also drying up. 
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The effects of the actions by the CB fcnd national government 
were to reduce formal credit available to the* private Sector, 
raise the market interest rates on deposits and loans, dampen 
investments, and reduce the demand for formal loans* The economy 
suffered two years of negative growth and vexy high inflation 
in 1985 and 1986. A study estimates that the underground economy 
dwelled during these years (NTRC, 1986). In the Social and 
political fronts, the worsening instability and peace and order 
problems led to the final ouster of the dictatorial regime in 
February 1986. 
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IV. REACTIONS OF THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS 
TO FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 
During the period 1974 to 1979, the response of the formal 
sector to the monetary and credit policies had resulted in 
significant growth rates in loans (Table 14), The ratio of real 
loans to GNP also rose from 1975 through 1983. It was a downhill 
trend thereafter; the performance of formal credit mirrored the 
bad state of the economy and the effects of very restrictive 
credit policies. By 1987, the real value of loans outstanding 
was equivalent only to the 1974 level. 
By sector the rural sector (proxied by agriculture) gained 
some but not at the expense of the non-agricultural sector. 
Improvements during the 1970s in the supply of bank loans to 
agriculture were evident in the rise of loans to output ratio. 
As in the non-agriculture sector, the credit crunch and high 
inflation rates pushed the supply level for agriculture to that 
of 1974-75 value. 
Within agriculture, the temporary success of credit programs 
in pushing loans to farmers was evident in the reallocation of 
formal loans during the 1974-1979 period. The realignment 
favored the palay sector, reflecting the effects of the M-99 
program. The palay loan to output ratio improved much, reaching 
26.8 percent in 1979, but dropping to 4.9 percent by 1986. 
On the whole, though, loans from credit programs composed 
only a small portion of total bank loans. In agriculture, they 
comprised less than 10 percent of total agricultural loans; they 
35 
also reached only about 3 percent of the small farming population 
(TBAC, 1985). 
Formal Sector Reactions to Challenges 
We define the challenges as those arising from the: 
a) competition posed by the ICM; b) policy constraints; and 
c) financial crisis of the 1980s. 
Competition from the ICM does not seem to be a threat to 
the formal system. Complementation more than substitution seems 
to be the case between the two credit markets. This is further 
explained by looking at the linkages and interactions between the 
formal and informal markets. 
Banks. The linkages that exist between the 
formal and informal can be discerned in a number of ways. The 
ICM lenders are either borrowers from and savers with (or both) 
the formal system. 
In 1978, more than half of the 163 rural informal lenders 
surveyed by TBAC (1981) in three (3) Philippine provinces were 
bank saver-bank borrowers or bank saver-nonbank borrowers, while 
three (3) informal lenders were at the same time owners of local 
banks. Eighty-four (84), or 52 percent, of these lenders were 
borrowers. Bank loan3 comprised close to half of their total 
borrowings, the bulk (four-fifthS) of which came from commercial 
banks. Loans sourced from the informal Sources amounted to only 
5 percent, while loans from input manufacturers (or trade credit) 
V comprised 15 percent. 
A later Study of 125 rural lenders operating in rice and 
coconut producing villages alSo found a relatively high degree of 
direct bank borrowing (Geron, 1988). Some 70 percent of the 
respondents obtained loans from banks. Such borrowings to 
augment capital are evidently tied to the lenders' trading 
businesses where lending iS but a tool to assure supply. 
Indirectly, therefore, formal institutions are Supporting 
the money lending activities of the informal lenders. A great 
deal of trade credit originating in the formal Sector ends up 
being lent informally. 
Buenaventura, a rural banker, puts it aptly: 
"Many of the informal lenders are our bank 
borrowers. In our area theSe are clients in the 
trading business - all formS of agriculture trading 
(ramie, rice, copra, corn) - with which their 
informal lending activities are linked. They are 
prime clients with collateral. In effect, they Serve 
aS conduits of bank funds to reach thoSe with 
limited or no direct accesS to the bank." 
Complementation. In the absence of trend data on ICM, we 
can at best deduce the competitive interaction^ between the ICM 
and the formal markets from our interviews with bankers. 
6/ 
TBAC, 1981, Table 78, p. 100, as corrected. 
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Bermudez articulated the viewpoint of the commercial bankers 
we interviewed, emphasizing that informal lenders are not bank 
competitors, rather, they complement the lending activities of 
the commercial bank: 
"The informal lenders operate in a different 
segment of the market. The bank's, market lie3 
largely in corporate and commercial accounts which 
are generally fully collateralized. In fact some of 
the informal lenders are, in effect, conduits of 
bank funds; this is the case with the poultry 
industry integrators. Our corporate clients secure 
working capital loans which they use in making 
advances to their contract growers. Advances are in 
the form of chicks, feeds, biologies, plus technical 
assistance. The same is true with our big grain 
miller and trader clients who provide advances to 
the paddy farmers in the regular course of their 
business. 
The bank is also a co-financier with the 
integrators. This is the case with some of our 
borrowing clients like the prawn and broiler 
producers, who are contract growers with the 
industry integrators. These informal lenders then 
are, in effect, giving business to the bank. 
Moreover, they become calibrator's of credit risks 
and make lending possible for the bank. They also 
become depositors." 
The foregoing discussions indicate the presence of a Strong 
linkage between certain segments of the formal and informal 
markets. They also spell role complementation between the two 
markets. Complementation is also Shown in the findings of a study 
of small and medium urban-based enterprises in Metro Manila and 
three (3) other regions of the country: formal sources supplied 
most long-term loans, while informal lenders provided most short-
term credit to the entrepreneurs (ISSI, 1985). 
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Looking at complementation in a broader context, the ICM 
provides smaller and shorter maturing credit to the,economy and 
to clients who have very limited or no access to formal finance, 
while the larger bank loans concentrate on the longer term credit 
with acceptable collaterals. 
An area of substitution - where the expansion of one takes 
place at the expense of the other - between the formal and the 
informal seems present only to a limited degree in a segment of 
the loans market. This is the small loans market wherein 
pawnshops, money shops, lending investors, and rural tjanks 
encroach into. About 80 percent of the loans of pawnshops to 
firms and households, which need guick liquidity, amount to ?500 
and below. The average loan size of rural bankte is also 
relatively small. For a time money shops, by regulation, could 
not grant loans to storeowners and stallholders for operating 
capital and/or inventory financing in excess of . pi0,000. This 
was later increased to ^20,000, but later lifted when a CB policy 
in 1983 converted all money shops into extension offices. 
Many rural banks have, in effect, become money shop 
operators since the floating rates policy was adopted. Abelardo 
the general manager of a rural bank located in a commercially 
busy town in Nueva Ecija, a province north of Manila, describes 
the element of competition in the context of. his bank's recent 
foray into the territory of the informal lenders; 
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"The bank directly competes with informal 
lenders in certain loan's market —like those of the 
small stpreowners and stallholders in the public 
market and other retailers with puwesto (store 
space) in the town. We started to give loans to 
these types of clients two years ago. At that time 
the fixed ceilings on interest charges had been 
removed. This made it possible for us to position 
our interest charges relative to our costs and 
perceptions of risks to service small loans. We 
prefer to lend to those with puwesto rather than to 
the ambulant traders, primarily for loan security 
reasons. These loans call for a daily collection 
scheme. Since our bank is close to the public 
market, we geared this part of our lending operation 
in the manner of a money shop. 
We also copied some of the methods of the 
informal lenders. Processing is done within 24 
hours. Only two co-guarantors are needed. We are 
also fast in collecting which is done by a bank 
personnel who does the rounds daily. Our interest 
rates on these small loans are also influenced by 
the informal lending rates. We charge between 50-60 
percent per annum. This is more than double our 
normal interest per annum (24% presently) on 
collateralized loans. But this is only half of the 
nominal 10 percent per month that informal lenders 
make in the public market. We are very Selective. 
We have to be because we know the informal lenders 
are there. Some of our clients are at the same time 
borrowers of the informal lenders. These lenders 
keep us on our toes and have made better and more 
efficient bankers out of us." 
Abelardo was, however, also quick to add that his bank and 
the informal lenders complement each other in a number of ways. 
First, the bank services the deposits of informal lenders, 
enabling the bank to use such funds. He cited the specific cases 
of at least three (3) mobile, motorcycle-riding money lenders of 
Indian descent. Known in almost all locales as the "bombays," 
these lenders have become quite ubiquitous in the informal credit 
markets. They have large bank deposits — up to ?100,000 
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according to Abe la r d o — and their daily collections get to be 
deposited with the rural bank. 
Second, some of the bank clients in the market place borrow 
additional amounts from the ICM. This happens since the bank may 
not be in a position to accommodate these borrowers' loan demand 
for operating capital. Usually this iS due th® bank's 
assessment of the repayment c^p^bility of the borrower or 
internal bank policy on loan ceilings. Thus, as in the case of 
the commercial bank, the rural bank becomes a co-financier with 
the informal lender's on comparatively smaller loan requirements. 
Moreover, those screened out in the selection process of 
formal institutions services become a market of the informal 
lenders. The case of the credit clientele in public markets, 
where money shops of banks were allowed by monetary authorities 
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to be set up to service market vendors, will illustrate the 
point. Experience over the years and internal frank policy ShiftS 
have made some money shops very selective. They also no longer 
grant loans below a certain loan Size because doing so iS 
administratively more costly. Similarly, they haVe tended to pay 
more attention to loan securities, whereas before loans were made 
on clean basis. 
In one urban public market in Metro Manila, a commercial 
bank money Shop, which had been operating since, 1973, ha3 ceased 
lending to vendors of perishable goods (vegetables, fish, fruits) 
"because they require small loans (below #5,000), and what they 
sell are not suitable for chattel mortgage." Thoke excluded in 
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the selection process are serviced by the other informal 
lenders, including some ten (10) five-six operators, and a 
credit cooperative. Around 60 percent of the credit demand in 
the public market is estimated to be served by the credit 
cooperative. This cooperative offers the lowest interest rates 
to members, much simpler processing requirements compared to the 
money shop's, and a variety of product lines including .loans for 
operating capital, and loans in kind like electrical and other 
household appliances. 
It can be said that certain financial innovations had sprung 
with an agenda of reaching segments of the traditional market of 
informal lenders. This was one of the motivations for pilot 
testing the money shops in 197 3. Money shops are the smallest 
unit or "scooping station" of the bank. The Philippine 
Commercial International Bank (PCIB) pioneered the concept both 
to address a social concern and to exploit a market opportunity 
in the small credit and deposits markets. The monetary 
authorities responded to this by granting flexible and longer 
banking hours to grant loans and accept deposits only, higher 
monthly service fees, and by making changes in policies to 
enlarge the territorial and clientele scope of money shops over 
time. 
Bank Responses to. In teres tRates. Policies. On the matter of 
monetary policy constraints, the regulated interest rates policy 
prior to deregulation had been creatively addressed by the formal 
Sector. These creative responses in effect transformed an 
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otherwise formal practice into informal. On top of the ceiling 
rates allowed, banks collected add-ons, like undisclosed service 
fee, inspection fee, discounting of interest, charging straight 
yield on amortized loans, frequent impounding, and requiring 
compensating balances or deposits for loan takers. 
The market-oriented policy now in place has given banks the 
freedom to charge rates according to their internal cost 
structures, the type of clients they service, and the competitive 
rates in the market. This is seen in Table 9. Indeed, by 1987, 
banks' real rates show a rather wide band between rates on loans 
and deposits. 
Certain government policies, however, have the effect of 
raising the cost of credit from formal sources. The 5 percent 
gross receipts tax on earnings from loans and the PD 717 
allocation raise the intermediation costs of banks. 
Reactions to Financial Crisis 
A segment of the formal sector had reacted positively to the 
financial crisis of the 1980s. Among these are the pawnshops and 
lending investors. Both expanded rapidly and had high positive 
real asset growth in 1985 and 1986 (Table 15). By contrast, the 
banking system suffered negative growth rates. The liquidity 
problems and declining purchasing power encountered by 
i 
households, small firms and fixed wage earner's have given an 
opportunity for small intermediaries to provide credit. Such 
development, however, was also a response to the floating 
interest rates. 
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On the other hand, the reaction of the government to the 
financial crisis and decline in credit to particular sectors was 
to try out certain innovations. By early 1980s, the rural 
banking system was already paralyzed. The state-owned Philippine 
National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines 
(DBP) had virtually stopped lending, the rediscounting policy 
framework had changed, and bank credit to the small farm sector 
had tightened. These prompted the government through the then 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food to embark in 1984 on a funded 
lending scheme using the informal lenders as conduits. Under the 
modified programs for rice (Intensified Rice Production Program, 
1984-87) and yellow corn production, the millers, traders, input 
suppliers as well as the government's rice and corn marketing 
agency, the National Food Authority (NFA) , were tapped to retail 
loans to farmers. The banking system was used as processing 
agents with very little risk exposure. The informal lenders had 
to be accredited by the government agency first. They were to 
lend the money to a list of identified borrowers according to 
/T' 
program lending guidelines. Reports on their lending were also 
' . • • ' ' C ' ' 
to be submitted for monitoring purposes. The^experiment, though, 
was short-lived, ending by mid-1987. An assessment of the scheme 
found that funds from the lending program merely substituted for 
the moneylenders' own resources (Esguerra, 1987). 
The 1986 presidential elections also tried to revive the 
supply of credit to the rural sector by using government leans 
to the cooperatives as a political tool. It was to be a feeble 
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attempt at best. The party in power lost and not all the loans 
promised got released. 
ICM Responses to Government Policy and 
Formal Financial Market Development 
To signal the responses of the ICM, a number of indicators 
will be described, to wit: the percentage of loans from the 
informal lenders, interest rates, and changes in structure. 
Informal^ Borrowing-Trends. Farm and rural household 
surveys conducted nationwide offer a clue to the trend of 
informal borrowings through time. 
The rural/farm borrowings Summarized beloW SuggeSt both a 
decline in proportion of population borrowing and loans taken 
from informal Sources over the last four (4) decades (details in 
Table 16). In terms of value of loans, informal borrowings had 
generally also exceeded the amount of informal credit, except in 
the 1981-82 survey. The 1981-82 survey was done at the 
homestretch period of farm lending programs and at J:he onset of 
the financial reforms and may explain the greater volume of loans 




Period Formal Informal 



























Adequate information on what happened during the succeeding 
•year's up to 1985 when formal credit became very tight is not 
available. At a more micro level, however, studies of rice farm 
villages point to very high levels of informal borrowings. 
Looking at the r u r a l dimension, the SWS-Ateneo 1986 and 1987 
surveys indicate a rise in borrowings and increasing share of 
the ICM in 1987 . In contrast, borrowers in urban areas outside 
Metro Manila experienced greater access to formal credit. 
Investments had risen during 1987, with the urban areas 
experiencing greater resurgence in economic activities. During 
the year, a number of commercial banks also started a more 
a g g r e s s i v e marketing of bank services outside Metro Manila. 
Structural Changes. Structural dynamism characterizes the 
ICM, with economic factors and shifts in policies marking their 
influence on the changes over the short and long terms. An 
example of the short term change is depicted in the rice farm 
credit when the M-99 program loans reduced to some extent 
informal lending for a brief period. 
Three changes in the countryside have made a long term 
imprint in the ICM structure, namely: the spread of rural 
banking , the changes in rice technology, and the agrarian reform 
program under which some 1.02 million former rice and corn 
tenants had become either holders of lease or certificate of land 
transfer by 1987. Farmers now play a leading role in the ICM, 
along with traders. The role of the landlords has receded. In 
the most recent surveys of ICM lenders in rice and coconut 
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farming areas, up to half of the informal sources were farmers 
(Geron; Armenia, 1988)* 
More variations in ICM arrangements have also appeared as a 
reaction to innovations from the organized sectors and the 
financial liberalization. Situations of tight credit had also 
brought to the surface more entrants in the ICM. The history of 
money lenders during the period 1967 to 1978 is provided by a 
TBAC study. It showed that the decline in formal credit to the 
palay sector brought in new informal lenders, five (5) years 
after M-99 was introduced as shown below (See also Table 17). 
More recent studies by Mangahas and Lava also found about 
half of the informal lenders as being relatively new in the 
business. They became lenders only from 1982 onwards, which are 
characterized by years of contractionary credit in the formal 
financial sector. 
The credit cooperative sector which has been growing on its 
own steam has also made creative adaptations of "central banking" 
since the 1970s to meet the growing demand of metobers. Central 
banking by federations of cooperatives mobilizes and interlends 
funds to member cooperatives generally for relending to 
individual members. The interlending facilities became much more 
impOjLisnt during the crisis period of the 1980s as liquidity 
pressures were felt by members of the cooperatives. 
Total No. of ICM lenders, 1976 - 163 
a. No. lending in 1967 - 94 





In te res t^  Rates on th^ICM. The informal sources are 
generally perceived to charge very high interest rates. It is, 
however f more accurate to say that there is a broad range of 
interest rates for a very heterogeneous market. From one end of 
the pole, we find "social" loans with zero or very low interest 
charges, moving up to rates approximating the formal institution 
charges (e.g., those from credit coops, foundations, and input 
dealers); at the top end of the pole, charges exceed 200 percent 
per annum. The high rateis prevailing in the ICM reflect the 
excess demand for loans such that people will still take out 
loans even if the interest rate were infinite. 
Lava, in her case studies, found one (1) rural ICM lender 
charging rates over 1000 percent per annum to the villagers, 
vendors, and handicraft makers, and one (1) urban lender with 
interest charges of 600 percent- p.a. to public market 
Stallholders. However, these are more the exceptions. The rates 
of 19 individual lenders were calculated to range between zero 
and over 1000 percent, three (3) urban and rural lenders were not 
collecting interest; nine (9) were charging between 35 and 85 
percent; 20 percent per month or 240 percent p.a. were collected 
by four (4) lenders. Two (.2) foundations were charging 20 and 29 
percent p.a., respectively, the credit coop at 4.4 percent, while 
one (1) ROSCA, true to its form, was not collecting any interest 
from members of the group. 
There are reasons to believe that the interest rates on 
informal loans may have declined over time, although we have 
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limited data base for now to be conclusive pn this. More formal 
institutions and outlets have been established from the 1950s to 
the present decade and the bank density ratio to population has 
improved. Formal institutions have been able to lend at higher 
rates since the lifting of the interest rates ceilings; Some of 
them ventured into the small loan segment of the market. The 
rapid growth of pawnshops and lending investors after 1983 and 
the adoption of the money shop approach by banks since the early 
1970s have made it possible for the formal sector to meet a 
portion of the excess credit demand. 
The TBAC study of informal lenders in 1978 concluded that 
the interest rates on the ICM also respond to the penetration of 
the formal institution in the market/and the presence of the 
informal sources charging rates parallel to bank rates. Rates on 
7/ 
" traditipnal" informal loanS were found lowest rn a province-
close to the urban Metro Manila. The province had a high density 
of formal sources and farm input dealers who were supplying 
credit in kind at rates similar to bank rates then. 
The more micro level case studies dramatize the tempering 
effect of the availability of formal loans on the level of 
informal rates. For instance, the influence of money shops in 
the level of interest rates in public markets are gathered from 
1/ 
The "traditional" loans were defined to exclude informal 
loans with rates similar to formal rates, and non-interest 
bearing non-commercial loans* 
interviews of persons in the money shop business. 8/ These 
informants Share the perception that money shops have been 
instrumental in bringing down the informal interest rates in 
public markets. An officer of the commercial bank which operated 
the largest number of money Shops provided some historical trend 
in informal rates in public markets they penetrated: 
Circa 1973* -- 20% /day 
Circa 1974 — 20% /week 
Circa 1975-1976 ~ 20% /month 
Early 1980s — 5-10% /mo. 
Under the regulated rate for money shops, this bank was 
collecting an effective rate of between 24-28 percent on clean 
loans. The ceiling rate then wa3 14 percent, but money shops 
were allowed to collect higher Service charge of 2 percent per 
month, amortized daily on a straight basis, with interest 
collected front end. With unregulated rates, the money shop 
loans are levied an effective rate of around 32-44 percent. 
The level of informal rates are wide ranging and are 
differentiated by certain economic factors.- For instance, 
between developed farming villages and marginal areas Floro 
observed lower rates in the former. By size of farm, that is, 
between the small, medium, and large farm operators, lower 
average rates of interest are extended to large farm holders 
(Swaminathan, 1982) (Refer to Table 18). 
8 ? 
One rural bank money shop, one (1) commercial bank money 
shop, and an officer of commercial bank's money shop/branches 
operations. 
* Marking bank's entry in the public markets. 
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The interest rates advantage enjoyed by the more 
commercialized and productive areas and large farms is perhaps 
linked with the volume of outputs informal lenders can capture 
from their farmer clients. In linked market arrangements, 
traders prefer to do business fitst with farmer's with greater 
volume of production to assure them of the raw Material supply. 
By and large, competitive pressure is likely exerted by various 
informal trader-lenders; but Such pressure o r i g i n a t e s from the 
trading side of the business — the need to vie for the same 
supply of goods -- rather than the lending side of it. 
V. CONCLUDING NOTES 
The informal credit suppliers continue to be the more 
accessible sources to the broader borrowing public. This is 
despite legislative and supply-led policies to reduce their size 
in the context of past environment. 
Nevertheless, financial innovations and adaptations in the 
formal financial system have provided alternatives to the ICM 
sources to a certain extent. These adaptations have been evident 
in the smaller substructures such as the rural banking system, 
pawnshops, money shops, and lending investors. Through these 
substructures, the formal system has been able to exploit, 
opportunities in and share a part of the informal credit markets. 
The formal and informal markets are, howevfer, largely 
complementary. They cater to what are essentially different 
segments of the financial markets. Various linkage^ exist, 
nonetheless, on both the resource generation side of the 
financial balance sheet and the lending side. Parallel 
innovations and linked market arrangements in the ICM have also 
made it possible to conduit formal loans to the informal 
borrowers. 
Liberal rediscounting policies which provided easy access to 
low cost funds from the CB played a key role in the expansionary 
trend of formal credit in the 1970s. However, the poor state of 
the economy, huge budget deficits, very tight credit policies, 
and a troubled socio-political environment during 1984-198.6 
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Severely contracted the formal credit supply. It ik noted that 
contractionary trends in the formal Sector had provided 
opportunities for new entrants to the ICM. Moreover, the Smaller 
substructure^ in the formal System had alSo reacted positively to 
the financial crisis aS much as to the freeing of the interest 
rates. 
in terms of Spatial dimension, the rural areas experienced 
wider access to formal credit during the early p^rt of the 1970S 
due to government credit program initiatives. It waS only for a 
brief period however.. Policies which develop countryside 
banking, the agrarian reform program, and policies that 
encourage changes in the production technology have exerted a 
longer term effect on the rural ICM. The effects are translated 
to Structural changed in informal Supplier's, which find farmers 
aS dominant lenders; in certain cases, the effect had been 
reflected in the moderation of informal ratek. 
Financial policies that regulate interest rates and 
the allocation of formal credit have been more harmful to the 
development of the financial System. The lifting of the interest 
rates ceilings have evidently produced a positive response from a 
segment of the formal SyStem to meet the liquidity and operating 
capital need's of households and fcmall finite. Cost7 increasing 
policies like the agrarian credit allocation and high reserve 
requirements are yet to be addressed. 
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There has been a rise in borrowings in the last two years 
and an increasing Share of the informal credit markets. The 
active responses from segments of the formal sector, nonetheless, 
reflect the potential for expanding financial services to the 
sector with little or no access to formal intermediaries by 
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Table 14 
Philippine Financial Systeti No, of Institutions, 
Total Assets and Percent Distribution of Assets, End 1986 
<Awunts in fll) 
Institutions 
No. of Institutions Total Assets 
Head All A«ount"<P)1}" "i'DiStrii 
Office Outlets a/ 
1 19 b/ 276,515 
3,002 5,979 331,586 lOO.fM 
. 
1,024 3,614 289,397 87.3 
30 c/ 1,764 237,055 71.5 
114 665 17,547 5.3 
43 213 5,579 1.7 
7 231 8,097 2.4 
6A 221 3,871 1.2 
87S 1,083 9,103 2.7 
3 100 25,693 7,8 
1,897 2,283 40,995 12.4 
13 40 7,519 2.3 
210 334 5,627 1.7 
124 124 945 0.3 
82 82 10,154 3.1 
11 11 1,288 0,4 
289 300 237 0.1 
1,143 1,367 1,011 0.3 
5 5 
3 d/ 3 14,088 4.2 
17 17 126 -
81 82 1,194 0.3 
7 7 16 _ 
74 75 1,178 0.3 
A. Centra] Bank 



























No. of Institutions Total Assets 
Institutions Head" All Amount <S> i Distribution 
Office Outlets »/ 
C. Offshore Banking 
Units 22 22 
D, Other Financial 
Institutions 
Private Insurance 130 g/ 22,7283 
Companies 
SS1S 1 20,678.3 g/ 
SSS 1 33,828.2 9/ 
a/ Includes head offices IHBs), branches or sub-branches, field offices, 
extension office, moneyshops, savings agencies, overseas offices (331) of local 
local banks. 
b/ As of September 1987; includes head office, four regional offices ttith 




c/ Includes nine 49> bants authorized to operate as universal bkvlts, 
d/ Includes National Development Company (NDC), National Hoae Nbrtgage 
Finance Corp., and the Phil. Veterans' Investment Dev. Corp. tPHIVEDEC) 
e/ Mutual Building and Loans Associations, 
f/ Non-stock Savings and Loans Associations 
g/ Data from CD, as of June 1987. 
Source of Datat CB. 1986 Fact Book: Philippine Financial System 
Table 14 
Financing Companies; No. of Units, 
Assets, and Loans, 1976-86 
(Amounts in M Pesos) 
No. of 
Year Units Total Real Per cent Average Loans Real Per cent Average 
(End Year) Assets Value Change Value Change 
(A) (B) (0 (Dl (C/A) (E) (F) (S) (H/A) 
1975 319 
1976 348 4644.0 2537.8 7.3 3422.0 1870.0 5.4 
1977 388 5852.0 2977.8 17.3 7.7 4190.0 2132.1 14.0 5.5 
1978 419 7366.0 3432.0 15.3 8.2 .5067.0 2360.8 10.7 5.6 
1979 *78 9743.0 3339.4 14.8 8.2 7926.0 3204.8 35.8 6.7 
1980 531 11902.1 4163.3 5.7 7.8 9164.2 3205.6 0.0 6.0 
1981 559 12123.3 3822.0 -8.2 6.8 9209.7 2903.5 -9.4 5.2 
1982 537 12919.4 3756.8 -1.7 7.0 9723.4 2827.4 -2.6 5.3 
1983 532 11810.8 3075.3 -18.1 5.8 8462.1 2203.4 -22.1 4.1 
1984 545 9253.8. 1616.4 -47.4 3.0 6560.3 1145.9 -48.0 2.1 
1985 353 6164.0 915.1 -43.4 2.6 4411.0 654.9 -42.a 1.9 
1986 •334 5627.0 821.3 -10.3 2.5 4126.0, 602.2 -8.0 1.8 
Source: CB. Fact Book: Philippine Financial Systen, various years. 
60 
Table 3 
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS FROM INFORMAL SOURCES,* 
BY KINSHIP/SOCIAL T I E S , VARIOUS STUDIES 
Study/Scope/Reference Friends/ 
Period Indicator Relatives Neighbors Landlords 
1 . BCS, 1960-61 No. of loans 30.1 1 .8 24.4 
Farm fami1ies Amount of loans 28.2 1 .4 23.6 
Nationwide 
2. TBAC, 1977 No. of borrowers 15.1 11.3 20.0 a/ 
Rice farmers 
Isabel a, Bulacan, 
Camarines Sur 
3. Floro, 1963-84 Amount of loans 9.8 b/ 2.9 




4. ISSI, 1984 Amount of loans c/ 78,0 15.9 NA 
Business entre-
preneurs 
Nat'l Capital Reg 
Regions 3, 4, 7 
5. NEDA, 1985 No. of loans 30.6 22.1 9.0 
Low income Amount of loans 22. 1 18.0 7.9 d/ 
families 
Nationwide 







7. Geron, 1987 No. of borrowers 22.7 34.4 .40 





*/ Balance accounted for by other informal sources. 
a/ Numb.er of loans 
b/ Friends and relatives 
c/ Short- and long-term loans combined 
d/ Employers/landlords 
e/ Percent of total borrowers from both formal and informal sources 
Sources: 
1. Studies Nos. 1 & 2 are from: Sacay, Agabin, & Tanchoco. Small Farmer 
Credit Dilemma, 1965. 
2. Floro, Sagrario. "Market Interlinkage in Philippine Agriculture" (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1986. 
3. Institute for Small Scale Industries, "Financial Factors and Small and 
Medium Enterprises in the Phi 1ippines." U,P. Diliman, Quezon City, 
1985. 
4. NEDA, "Study on Government Assistance to Low-Income Groups With Inadequate 
Access to Institutional Credit." (Chapter 4). April 1987. 
5. Gatchalian, Gatchalian, Almeda, and Barranco. Nature, Consequences and 
Prospects of Underground Employment in Four Cities in Metro Manila. 
Quezon City, 1986. 
6. Geron, Ma. Piedad. "Philippine Informal Rural Credit Markets: Efficiency 
and Equity Issues." Paper presented during the workshop on "Policy 
Considerations for Structural Changes and Development in the Agri-
cultural Sector," sponsored by the Agricultural Policy Research 
Program, March 29-30, 1968, U.P. at Los Ban'os. 
Table 14 
SUHHARV OF STUDIES INDICATING LEVEL OF INDEBTEDNESS 
VARIOUS YEARS 
Period Author/Date 
Covered of Publication Location of No. and Type Percent 
(Crop year) a/ or Release Study of Respondents Borrowing 
1954-55 de Suzman (1975) Nationwide 5,144 farmers 75.0 
1757-58 Sapud (1958) (Nunor) Nueva 
Ecija 
78 rice farmers 97.4 
1957-58 Sacay (19611 Nationwide 400 farters 87.0 
1960-61 BCS (1963) Nationwide 2,433,000 fart 
households b/ 
45.2 
1967-70 Nangahas (1975) Camarines Sur, 
Iloilo, 
South Cotabate 
567 rice,farmers 26.6 
1970-71 Hangahas (1975) Camarines Sur, 
Iloilo, 
South Cotabato 
567 rice farmers 52.4 
1969-70 Almario (1970) (Nina!in) 
Pa«panga 
97 farmers 95.9 








1974-75 Octavio (1976) Bulacan 120 N-99 farmer- • 
borrowers 
68,2 











1977-78 Laopao & Latorre 
(1979) 
Leyte 221 fishing 
households 
18.6 
1978 TBAC (J981) Bulacan, 
Camarines Sur, 
Isabela 
1,828 rice farm 
households 
63.8 








240 cattle raisers 84.6 
>980 Capistrano (1982) Nueva Ecija 64 village 
households 
64.1 




Covered of Publication Location of No. and Type Percent 
(Crop Year) a1 ' or Release Study of Respondents Borrowing 




ACES area: c/ 87.7 
(4 barangays, 
97 farters) 
1981-82 TBAC (1936) Nationwide 2,143,800 fan 29.2 
households d/ 
1993 Siith t Ussli Caearines Sur 69 rainfed rice 
(1985) farters 14.0 e/ 
1983 Hanoi a <1984) Abra, Cagayan, 90 fare 92.2 f/ 








1984 IIP Institute of National 230 business 63.5 
Seal1-scale Capital Region entrepreneurs 
Industries Regions III, 
IV, 4 VII 
1985 NEDft (19871 Nationwide 25.945 N low- 13.08 g/ 





1986 Ateneo-SNS Nationwide 1,200 respondents 32.2 h/ 
Oct. 84 Survey of voting age 
Data <29.78 H voting 
population) 
1987 Ateneo-SNS Nationwide 
Oct. 87 Survey 
Data -do- 34.7 y 
a/ Refers to loans taken during the crop year, except otherwise indicated, 
it/ Nationwide estiaates of survey results; includes fart households cultivating 
O.l hectare. 
cl Agency for Couunity Educational Services. One purpose of Swaainatban's 
survey Mas to monitor progress in a stall faraers' coaaunity organization 
project wherein ACES was involved, 
d/ Nationwide estiiates werfc derived froa a survey of 338 faraing barangays in 12 
regions covering stall faraers with landholdings of 7 hectares and less, 
e/ Faraers were interviewed as to their survival strategies during disaster 
years. Another 37X of the respondents sought financial help froa friends and 
relatives without interest during the period, a disastrous year due to 
frequent flooding and drought, 
f/ Percentage of villages responding. Village key inforaants supplied data off 
local community characteristics. Seven villages did not avail of credit during 
the period. 
g/ Borrowers anytiae froa 1975 to 1985. Percentage was projected to population 
of low incoae farmer-respondents in the bottom 30 percent of incoae 
classification. 
h/ Percentage was coaputed using projected population weights. 
Sources: 
1. Adapted front Sacay, Agahin, I Tanchoce. Saall Faraer Credit Dileaaa, 1985. 
2. Ateneo-Social (leather Stations. October 1986 & 1987 Survey Data. 
3. Capistrano, Ana Doris N. 'Study of A Village Economy: The Case of Villarica, 
Pantabangan, Nueva Eci ja." U.S. thesis, U.P. Los Banos, 1982. 
4. laopao, Manuel and Latorre, Estrella. Small-Scale Fishing in Leyte Province: A 
Socio-Econoaic Survey. Econoaic Research Report, BAEcon, Series No. 8, 
October 1979. 
5. Nanalo, Leonardo. 'Credit Program for Cattle Raisers in Cagayan Valley." 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Centro Escolar University, 1979. 
6. NEDA. 'A Study on Sovernaent Assistance to Low-Incoae Sroups with Inadequate Access 
to Institutional Credit,' 1985. 1987. 
7. Ranola, Roberto Jr. "Cropping Systeas and Determinants: Factors Influencing 
Cropping Patterns, Fertilizer-Use and Resource-Use Efficiency.* Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1984. 
8. Salundaguit, Leonila T. "Socio-Econoaic Analysis of Credit Requirements for 
Agrarian Refora Beneficiaries in Leyte Province.' M.S. thesis, U.P. Los Banos, 
1980. 
9. Santiago, Carolina P. 'Land Tenure Status and Other Correlates of Adoption of 
Recomaended Production Practices Among Coconut Faraers in Baybay, Leyte." 
N,A. thesis, U.P. at Los Bands, 1981. 
10. Saith, Joyotee and Uaali, Gloria. 'Crop Insurance and Fertilizer Management on 
Rainfed Rice." IRRI paper presented at the 29th Annual Conference of the 
Australian Agricultural Economics Society, University of New England. 
11. Swaainathan, Nadhura. "The Study on the Credit Behavior of Fara Faailies in 
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13. U.P. Business Research Foundation, Inc. Saall Faraers' Subsistence Loans. 
Unpublished project report funded by TBAC, Manila, 1977, 
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T a b l e 4 a . 
P e r c e n t D i s r i b u t i o n o + A m o u n t 
o f L o q k n e , 1 9 8 7 
A m o u n t P e r c e n t 
S o u r c e <PB> S h a r e 
F o r m a l I S . ,2 3 4 . 0 
I n f o r m a l 2 6 . ,5 5 9 . ,0 
M i x e d 3 . -2 7 . ,0 
T o t a l 4 4 . ,9 1 0 0 . ,0 
S o u r c e : S W S - A t e n e o U n i v e r s i t y . 
O c t . 1 9 9 7 S u r v e y D a t a . 
Table 5 
SiEiritution of Sorrowers in Metro Manila, 
Urban, and Rural'Philippines, by Source of Credit, 1986 & 1987 
iin Percent) 
All Phils. Metro Hani la Urban Rural 
1986 1987" 1984 l987~ ~1986 I?87~ ~1986 1987 
I. Borrowers as X 32,0 35.0 33.0 36.0 31.0 33.0 33,0 36.0 
of total population 
iR locale 
Formal 10.0 30,0 11.0 13.0 10,0 16.0 10.0 7.0 
Informal 21.C 23.0 20,0 22.0 20.0 15.0 22.0 27.0 
nixed 1..0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 2,0 1.0 2.0 
II. Per cent distribu-






















Sourcei SKS-flteneo University. Public Opinion Report Surveys, October 1986 
and October 1987. 
Note; Jn the 1987 survey, "borrowers" are identified as those having borrowed 
at least P/1,000 in the past 12 months. In the 1986 survey, there is no 
minimum amount specified. 
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Table 6 
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS AND POLICIES, VftftlDUS .SECTORS, 1970-B7 
Macro/General CIisate 
Year (Socio-Po)itical, External 
Developaents) 
Foreign Sector fiscal Monetary flqric./Industrial 
Sectors 
1970 I 43X devaluation 
I reduction in se-
lected tariff rates 
t export-oriented 
policy regiae 
I 3rd balance of 
payaents crisis 
occasioned by 1969 
reelection spending 
1971 
1972 t Martial Law proclaiaed 
in Septeaber 
1973 t Record growth in real 
6NF at 9.61 due to 
export booa 
> Trade surplus as 
a result of cDiBfio-
dity boaa, esp. 
coconut and sugar 
t BOP surplus posted 
at $665 M 
II Financial reforas adopted 
foraally enforcing finan-
cial specialization 
i Contract- I Monetary Board given 
ionary di- authority to prescribe aax, 
rection in deposit and lending rates; 
gov't spending virtually repealed Anti-
adopted to Usury Act of 1916. (Between 
help offset 1974 & 19BO, 4 interest 
infusion of rate reforas were carried 
liquidity froa out to aotoilize long-tern 
external funds k to develop capital 
sources earket.] 
t CB sale of CBCls to siphon 
ofI excess liquidity 
I Preferential rediscount!nq 
policy for aggie credit 
prograa 
I Severe droughts in 
Mindanao 1 typhoons 
in C. Luzon pulled 
agricultural 
production down 
? Most aassive cre-
dit prograa for 
aggie sector (H99) 
*as launched, rice 
sector 
t Nationwide agra-
rian refora prograa 
decreed iPD 27) 
1974 t Inflation rate rose t lst oil shock; 








period during CY 
1974-1975 
I Natl gov't 8 1974 narks the beginning t N99 prcgraa 
cost of oil rose by budget surplus 









of transition period toward 
financial liberalization to 
aobilize long-tera funds 
for investaents It to deve-
lop capital market 
#t Ceilings on short-tera 
deposits increased froa 




Year (Bocio-Political, External 
Develapaents) 
Foreign Sector Fiscal Monetary Agric./Industrial 
Sectors 
1975 t Recessionary & infla- t Depressed world 
tionary probleas en-
countered by developed 
and developing 




prices for exports 
& increased oil 
bills, resulting in 
substantial trade 
it BOP deficits 
t COP surplus 
attained partly 
attributed to the 















rise in gov't 
foreign bor-
rowing 
t PD 717, agri-agra credit 
quota policy introduced 
aakiog allocation of 251 of 
net loanable funds generated 
aandatory 
I Denand stimlative'aea-
sures adapted to offset 
drain due to external tran-
sactions 
ft Credits trap CB rose to 194X 
for preferred areas of in-
vestaent; CB rediscounts 
served as liquidity source 
in aonetary and credit 
systeas 
*CB circulars 492-498 to 
encourage lonq-tera deposits, 
investaents, it narrow spread 
between regular bank depo-
sits/loan rates aoney 
aarket transactions 
I Second interest rate refer* 
took place as a response to. 
the challenge posed by rapid-
ly growing deposit substi-
tutes & other high-yielding 
money aarket instruments: 
MSavings increased to 71 
MTD increased to B. 5-121 _ 
II Ceiling of i7S iapased on 
dep. substitutes, and reserve 
reg't of 2QX was introduced 
11 Interest ceilings on long-' 
tera loans increased to 19X 
p.a 
8 Interest rates reforas were 
adopted aimed at reducing 
effective costs of funds to 
stiaulate investaents 
M Interest rate ceilings on 
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Macro/General Climate 
Year (Socio-Political, External 
Developments) 
Foreign Sector Fiscal Monetary fiqric./Industrial 
Sectors 
loans were Hade the effective 
ceiling rates 
iti Effective ceiling an short -
tern deposit substitutes 
reduced to 151 
S* 351 transactions.ta* 
imposed on primary borrowings 
in the ®oney market 
I C6 iiberalned rediscauntinq 
c-f export papers, especially 
on nan-traditionals 
1978 i Bank lending rates under M99 
,!i ilasaqanang -flaisan lowered 
I Rediscounting & bank Unding 
rates for other preferred 
activities standardized 
ft increase in rediscounts 
ceiling of KBs up to 50 X to 
finance non-traditional ex-
ports 4 small-scale indus-
tries^ Circular 632) 
1979 » After 2nd oil shock, 
gov't stated policy 
was to engage in 
'counter-cyclical po-
licy' which had en-
tailed increased rate 
of foreign borrowing 
under gov't guarantee; 
huge increases in bud-
get financed primarily 
thru foreign, mostly 
short-tera borrowinq 
(Hontes) 
t 2nd ail shock 
I Rising interest 
rate in int'ernat"! 
capital market 
« BOP affected by 
unfavorable trade 
conditions 4. re-
newed hikes in 
petroleum prices 
it Interest rate ceilings in-
creased by 2 percentage 
points across the board main-
ly tD aliqn domestic interest 
rates with those prevailing 
in world financial centers 
& thus discourage capital 
outflows to; encourage more 
bank deposits 
1980 * Large budget t Basic rediscountinq requ- t Crop insurance 
deficits lations attended with new 
hsgan rediscountinq ceilings, 
to appear rates, & values to encourage 
banks to tap other sources 
of funds/lessen dependence 








Year (Socio-political, External 
Developments) 
Foreign Sector Fiscal Monetary Agric./Industrial 
Sectors 
1981 t Liquidity crisis in 
early part of the 
year 
t Severe recession 
abroad 
» BOP deficit 
widened 
1982 t Econoay experiences 
full impact of adverse 
developments caused by 
external global recess-
ion; international 
interest rates at 
highest level 
t Budget defi-
cit reached a 
staggering 
P12.2 B up 
from P3.4 B 
in 'BO and 
funded by cur-
rency creation 
to the extent 
















t Financial reforms insti-
tuted to i) promote greater 
efficiency via more competi-
tion; ii) increase availabi-
lity i access to longer term 
funds; functional different-
iation among banks reduced; 
"universal banking" intro-
duced, with broader range of 
financial services; nin. 
capital req't for each type 
of financial entity was 
increased 
4 Credit expansion slowed 
down to check inflationary 
pressure 
t July: financial liberaliza-
tion prog, began; interest 
rate ceilings lifted or. all 
types of deposits and leans, 
except short-term loans & 
supervised dredit loans 
8 Start of financial crisis; 6 
major banks icaae under con-
trol of. gov't; problems 
increased gdvt's demand for 
financing 
t Feb. '81; iteserve req'ts on 
deposits of 730 days or less 
reduced fro* 201 to 19X 
t Start of rationalization 
program for gov't securities; 
started the phaseaut of CBCIs 
(issued in '70s mainly to re-
channel funds from urban to 
to rural areas) 
t Crisis in domestic financial 
system during the early part 
of the year 
t CB introduced a medium- and 
long-term rediscount facility 
to encouragte longer term 
maturity transformation of 
loans of expanded KBs; also, 
promissory hotes by approved 
high-grade shares of stock 
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Macro/General Cliaate 
Year (Socio-Political, Externa) 
Developaents) 




I August 21; Aquino 
assassination. Crisis 
starts October, 
t Accelerated capital 
Flight 
• BOP crisis due to 
int'l econ. environ-
aent fc doaestic poli-
cies; policies becaae 
very restrictive as 
a result (Laaberte) 
t Period of deep 
internal recession 
I 50X inflation rate, 
thus reducing incoae 
level for the popl'n' 
I Real output fell by 
6.BI 
t Kin. legislated wages 
increased 3 tiaes by a 
total of 77X (noainal), 
but in real teres C78 
prices) wages had 
fallen 
I May: elections for the 
neabers of parliaaent 
t Outstanding 
external debt at 
start of crisis 
110/B3) was 72.7X 
of 6NP; debt 
service was 35.7X 
t Peso devaluation 
froa tl:P9 to 
$1:P11 , 
t 17 Oct.: peso de-
valued froa $1:P11 




I June: devaluation 
to *1:P18 
# October: exchange 
rate freed 
t Deceaber: abo-














at 31 peaked 
at 10Z by 
June 1984 
could be rediscounted 
t Interest rate ceiling an 
short-ten loans lifted 
except ceilings on supervised/ 








of 30Z on top 
of existing 
export duties 
t Oct.: foreign 
exchange tran-
sactions tax 
of IX iaposed 







t CB credits to the public 
sector significantly 
increased before election, 
while credits to deposit 
banks were being decreased 
* Sale of CB bills (Jobo 
bills) at interest rates 
that peaked at 43Z in 
Oct.— powerful t des-
tructive intervention (CB 
directly borrrowirtg froa 
financial systea to reduce 
aonetry base & liquidity) 
t Aggie credit fell 
noainally by 35.9K 
froa 1983 level 
# Oct.: all price 
controls on basic 
coaaodities, except 
on rice, were 
reaoved 
1985 t Real output fell by 
3.8Z 
t Inflation decelerated 
* Jan.: CB rediscounting rate 




Year (Socio-Political, External 
Developments) 




t Depressed deoand and 
enployaent 
t Feb. snap presidential 
election 
t February revolution; 
overthrow of Marcos 
regiae 
* 1st sea. 6NP growth 
rate at 5 X 
t May: senatorial and 
congressional elections 
ft July: Congress convenes 
I Aug. 2B: serious coup 
atteapt staged 
ft Restraint dn growth of 
aoney applied 
ft TD rates rase; interjst 
rates on loans shot up 
ft Reserve requireaents re-
duced from previous 23X to 
21X by August bo pursue 
aonetary expansion policy to 
prop up investaents 
# Rediscount rates adjusted to 
12.751; unifara rates and 
rediscount value adopted foe 
all types of loans and banks 
ft Long-term papers and loans 
funded by S|Ds excluded froa 
rediscountirig with CB 
ft Floating r*tes to end users 
adopted 
t Special credit prograas for 
aggie consolidated into 
Coaprehensive Agric'l Loan 
Fund (CALF) primarily as 
guarantee facility; direct 
prograa lending for phaseout 
t Rediscount: rates fixed at 
11.75X following the decli-
ning trend in the aarket 
•Price control on 
rice reaoved 
(Septenber) 
I Agrkultural growtn 
for 1st see: less 
than IX; harvests 




POLICY DIRECTIONS: RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, REDISCOUNTS POLICY, OPEN MARKET 








Open liar feet 
Operation it 
<0W0> 






{in real t«r«f) 
197^ * Contractionary * Belos savings * Contractionary 
to counteract and TD rates 
effects of peso 
devaluation and 
election spending 
* Series of up-
ward adjustments 
from 161 before 
Feb. 16 to 201 
by Aug. 1 for KBs 
t Series of up-
ward adjustments 
for RBs range of 
7-111 to 10-141 
t Fixed at 62 
for savings; 
6,5 to 82'for 
TD; ceiling-on 




at 122 on secured 
loans 


















* Reduced rates * Very 
for aggie; contractionary 
increase in (-27.42) 
non-aggie re-
discount to 52 
t Increased 
rediscount 
rates to 52 
for aggie to 
KBs 


















sit rate of 































Interest Rate Ceilings 
Deposits Loans 
Loans 
Vol use Direction 
of Loans Out-
standing 
{in real tsriss) 
-dc-





* Reserves or 
RS savings 4 ID 
of 730 days or 
less ssturity 





'* Reserve rates 
maintained 
{sup. credit! in 
aggie; 1 1 on 
R99 papers 
t Reduction in 
non-aggie redis-
count rates to 
unifors 57. 
e Rate.to K U 
for SC reduced 
fr'os 5S to II 
to encourage KBs 
to participate 















ments by one per-
centage point on 
savings, and! half 
to one percentage 
point on IDs 
-do-
"du" 






1977 -do * Rate adjust- * Slightly 
aent for redis- expansionary 
counts of KBs (6.3J) 
fro» unitary 5X 
for non-aggie to 
differentiated 
rates ranging 
fros 5-37, with 
lower rates for 
preferred areas 
.1976 -do- f Rate for ordi-
nary agricul-
ture reduced fay 
1 percentage pt. 
* flange :or non-
i So changes' -do-
* Very 
expansionary 












Year Reserves Interest Volume 
Rates Direction 
(real terms! 
aggie changed to 
4-9X 
1978 * Long-term pa-
pers made eli-
gible at 8X 
* Expansionary 
1979 * Reduced re- i Non-aggie * Very 
serves on TDs rediscount expansionary 
from 20X to rates generally (45.07,1 
101 on the 4th reduced from 
qtr, of the yr. 4-9X to 4-6X 














* Ho major 
changes 
* Reserve rate 
on TDs restored 
to 10" during 
3rd quarter of 
the year 












* Fixed at 
9-9.31 on 
savings; 
14-14.51 on TDs 
* Reduced re-
serves to 19X 
in Feb.; im-
posed IX re-
serves on TDs 











to 3X on SC c/ (12.911 
Jr 8X for non-
preferred cre-
dits in both 







* Ceiling t Moderately 
raised by 2 expansionary 
percent points (10.9X) only 
to 14X p.a. due to double-
digit inflation 
rate; nominal 
values rose by 
24.4% 
» No change » Real growth 
slightly con-
tractionary 
(-0.9X1 due to 
high inflation 
rate; nominal 
values rose by 
14.6X 
t Lifted ceiling * Slightly ex-
rates, except on pansionary" 
short-term loans {7,1X1 







t Market rates, 
WATR i! at 9.8
y 
on savings and 






c/ SC - Supervised credit/special credit prograsj loans 
WAIR - Weighted average interest rate 
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Rediscounting Interest Rate Ceilings 
Loan 5 
Voluae Direction 
Year Reserves Interest Voluw Operation a/ Deposits Loans of Loans Out* 
Rates Direction (QMO) standing 
(real teras) (in real terns) 




1933 * Reserves in- * generally * Very « Slight dec- * Lifted ceiling * Expansionary 10 
creased to •flintained contractionary line in NAIRs on short-ten (17.61) 
in Sept., 201 i rates 1-21.6X1 loans t But new loans 
in. Oct.. 25,51 » Further in- granted, real 
in Nov., finally, creases i<n teres declined by 
235 in Dec. aarket rates sose 61 
* Contractionary t Contractionary 
1984 •i increased to t Rates still t Ex treacly * Contraction- * Slight * Yearly NAIR » Very con^ 
241 in April aulti-tiered fc contractionary ary) high-yield increase on all aaturities, contractionary 
i Contractio- lower for pre- (-49.21) T-bils t CB savings rate; cliabed to 26.71 1-34.3* )i 
nary ferrsd'areas but bills sold to TD rate, HAIR (contractionary), » Real leans 
now related to public starting rose to 24.161 but negative granted also 
MRR; however, 2nd sesester real rate declined by 36.91 
non-price ration- (-23.21) 
ing strategies-
adopted at the 
C8 rediscount 
* Contractionary 
,1985 » Contractionary t 1984 levels t Moderately ( Highly con- * Moderate in- * Rise conti-
% 
t Very con-
* Reserves re- generally sain- contractionary tractionary on crease in nued; NAIR, all tractionary 
duced one p<er- talned; adjust- (-14,31) credits avai- savings rate; aaturities at 1-25.31) 
fphtage point able and uniforik lable to public, slight deciine 28.21 f Loans granted, 
in Sept enter rate adopted with QUO offer- on TDs * Contractionary real teras, also 
beginning Nov., ring high yields declined by 29.71 
with floating on T-bills & CS 
fate of 12.751 bills (Jobo) be-
ginning 2nd half 
of 1984; con-
tractionary until 
3rd quarter of 
1985 
1986 * Reserves re- » Rate of f Moderately * Significant * Down to 17.351 * LO yoluae dec-
duced to 221 in 12.751 pre- expansionary dec line in Sa- noafnally but line by 28.31 due 
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Loans 
Rediscounting Interest Rate Ceilings 
Open Market Vol use Direction 
Loans of Loans Out-Year Reserves Interest Volume Operation a/ Deposits 
Rates Direction (0M0! 
(real teres) 
standing 
(in real terms) 
1986 May; by Dec. vailed until ( End-May data 
TDs .with over September when increase of 3,27. 
730 days aatu- rates decreased 
rity reduced by 1 percentage, 
•from A to 57. then down to 107. 
vings and TD real spread transfer of non-
rates still very high performing assets 
* Expansionary of 2 gov't banks; 




ary toward 4th 
quarter of year) 
creased by about 
20X, real terms 
1987 t Reserves * Rate of 10X * N-fi-
reman un- starting Dec. 'Si 
changed as of held on till 
Nov. 1987 present (Nov.'87) 
* Further 
declines 
* Down to 12.87. * Slightly 
by 2nd quarter expansionary 
* Expansionary (4.3X1 
N.A. - Data not available as yet. 
Note; Growth rates of rediscounts and loans outstanding are described as either expansionary or contractionary according to 
following annual growth raatesr 
Sligtly - 107, and below 
Moderately - 10.IX - 202 
Very - 20.IX- 307. 
Extremely - above 30X 
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Table 8. INTEREST RATE CEILINGS ON DEPOSITS, NominalReal, 1961-1981 
(in percent per annum) 
Nominal Aeal 
£ffectivity Date aI Savings Time Savings Time 
KBs* Others b/! 
i 
KBs Others ! 
i 
KBs Others ! 
I 
KBs Others 
19b9 6 6 6.5-7 6,5-7 4.8 4.8 5.3-5.8 . S.3-5.8 
1970 C/ 6 6 6.5-8 6.5-8 (8,85) (8.85) (8.35H6.85) (8.4)-(6.85! 
1971 6 6 6.5-8 6.5-8 (15.9) (15.9) (15.4)-(13,9) (15.4)-(13.9) 
1972 b 6 6.5-8 6,5-8 (2.23) (2.23) (1.73)-(0.23) (1.7)-(0,23) 
197-3 6 6 6.5-8 6.5-8 (10.5) (10.5) (10.0H8.5) (10.0)-(8.5) 
1974 6 6.5 8.0-11 8.5-11.5 (28.16) (27.7) (26.2)-(23,16) (25.7)-(22.7) 
1975 6 6.5 8.0-11 8.5-11.. 5 (0.78) (0.3) (0.73)-2.77 1.72-4,72 
1976 7 7.5 d/ 0.5-12 9.0-12.5 e/ (2.23) "(1.73) (0.73)-2.77 (0.23)-3.27 
1977 7 7.5 8.5-12 9.0-12.5 e/- (2.23) 0.21 1.21-4.71 (0.23)-3.27' 
1978 7 7,5 8.5-12 9.0-12.5 (0.29) (9.01) (8.01H4.51) 1.71-5.21 
1979 f/ 1 7.5 8.5-12 9.0-12.5 (9.51) (3.1) (3.6)-{17.6) (7.51)"(4.0l) 









June 26, 1981 no ceiling k/ no ceiling k/ 
* Commercial Banks 
aI Effectivity date of new rates. 
bI This includes Savings, Rural, Development, and Cooperative Banks, and Savings and Loar Associations, 
c/ There is no administrative ceiling for interest payments on time deposits if over two years, 
d/ For development banks it was 7, none for cooperative banks, 
e/ For development banks it was 8.5-12, none for cooperative banks. 
f/ Interest rates on "NOW" accounts also took effect. Dnly savings ana development banks and savings and loan 
associations had a rate of 5%; the rest had none, 
gI This rate is applicable to Unibanks, KBs, DBP, and Land Bank. 
h/ Applicable to thrift and rural banks only. "NOW" accounts rate for institutions in g/ and h/ is 7%. 
i/ True for deposits with original maturity of 730 days or less in g/ institutions. However, there was no ceiling 
for deposits with original maturity of more than 730 days. The same applies for deposits in thrift and rural 
banks. 
)l True for deposits with original maturity of 730" days or less in h/ institutions 
k/ Applies to ail banking institutions ana to "NOW" accounts. 
Source: NEDA. Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1986. 
CB-Dept. of Economic Research. 
Table 9 
Nominal & Real Interest Rates on 
Secured Loans of C o m m e r c i a l 
Banks, 1970-86 a 
( i n '/. p . a . > 
Year 
(End of 
Per i od > 
Nomi nal Real 
1970 12.0 (2.85) 
1971 12.0 (9.9) 
1972 12.0 (3.77) 
1973 12.0 (4.3) 
1974 12.0 (22.16) 
1975 12.0 (5.22) 
1976 12.0 (2.77) 
1977 12.0 2.07 
1978 12.0 4.71 
1979 14.0 (2.51) 
1980 14.0 (3,6) 
1981 1.7.1 4.7 
1982 18.2 8.0 
1983 19.3 9.2 
1984 26.7 <23.2) 
1983 28.2 5. 1 
1986 17. 3 16*6 
a/ Administistrative ceiling rates 
•from 1970-1980. From 1981 to 1986 
nominal rates represent weighted 
average interest rate (WAIR) on 
secured loans, all maturities of 
8 selected KBs only, 




CHANGES IN REDISCOUNT SATES, C8H8ERC1AL BANKS & THRIFT BAWS, 1770-87 
{in Percent per annus! 
KBs and Thrift Banks 
CB Circular/ fear/Bate Agriculture Non-Agriculture bi 
or of Authority 
NB Resol'n. SC NSC it 
NBR 1686 Hay 5, 1970 3-4 4.75-5,75 
1973 3 3 5.75-6 
Circ. 442 Dec. 12, 1974 5 5 5 
Circ. 472 June 30, 1975 1 -do- -do-
Circ. 543 Oct. 26, 1976 1 for -do- -do-
H99 fc m 
papers 
1977 1 -do- 5-8 
5Z for keall industr'l, 
export,!j, lining; 6-8Z for 
other papers depending on 
whether priorities A <6X1, 
B <7Z), or C t8J) 
Circ. 610 Nay 9, 1973 -do- 4 4-9 
long-tefa papers included 
at 82 
Circ. 635 Oct. 12, 1978 -do- 3-4 d -do-
Circ. 664 March 19, 1979 -do- -do- -do-
long-teri papers reduced to 
6 it 
Circ. 672 April 6, 1979 -do- -do- 4-6 
other papers reduced to 6Z 
Circ. 750 Aug. 22, 1980 -do- 1-4 d/ 3-6 
121 for long-tera papers of 
NBSBs 
Circ. 784 Feb. 27, 1981 3 3 8 
3 3 for non-traditional export 
{special industry; 3-10 for 1 




Circ. 803 June 18, 1981 -do- -do- long-tfcrs paper reduced to 
1-3 A 
KBs and Thrift Banks 
CB Circular/ Year/Date Agriculture Son-Agriculture b/ 
or of Authority _ _ 
HB Resol'n. 3C NSC a / 
Cirf. 872 April 26, 1982 -do- -oo- -do-
General purpose papers for 
dendrcthermal, minihydro, It 
small self-contained energy 
reduced to 31 
Circ. 981 Nov. 22, 1983 -do- -do- Traditional export reduced 
to 7Z from 81} non-tradi-
tional export increased fro* 
11 to 81 
Circ, 991 Jan. 23, 1984 -do- -do- Non-traditional export 
decreased to 7X; traditional 
expert, long-term papers, 
% gen. purpose papers 
adjusted to lending rate (6*1 




NR8 - 3 for long-term papers 
NRR - 6 for general purpose 
credit 
NRR -9 for non-trad, export 
NRR - 10 for NFA, FTI, & 
Food Suedan papers 
Circ. 1063 Kay 30, 1985 -do- -do- Export industr'l, trad. & 
non-trad, adjusted to NRR - 6 
Circ. 1086 November 1985 a. Rates adjustable according to sarfcet directions. 
b, Rediscounting of STO-funded credits and long-
term papers no longer alloited. 
12.75 
Eff. Sept. 1986 ll.75 
Eff. Dec. 1986 to 
present (Oct. '871 
10.00 
a/ Non-supervised credit includes food production, agrarian reform fnitablelO 
credits, NSA papers, and grains Suedan papers. 3/19/85 
b/ Includes agricultural, industrial, and commercial credits, small industry, 
expprt (trad, and non-trad,} industries; general purpose papers, and long-term papers, 
c/ Only NSA papers at 3X. 
d/ Agrarian reform credits reduced from 3 to 12. 
SC = Supervised Credit UFA = National Food Authority 
NSC =~«on-Supervi&ed Credit FT1 = Food Terminal, Inc. 
BBS = Honetary Board Resolution NRR - Hani la Reference Rate 
Source of basic data: Central Sank. 
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Table 11 
MASAGANA 99: NUMBER OF BORROWERS, AMOUNT OF LOANS 
AND HECTARAGE FINANCED, CY 1973-87 
Amount, of Loans Number oi 
Granted <M Pesos) Farmers with •Hectares 
Crop Phase a/ M--99 Loans Fi nsnced 
Year Nomi nal Real { '.k)00> <'000) <1972 100) 
1973/74 1 373. 0 1 ^  «. / / ~39679"~ 618.2 
2 230. 7 149. 1 220.0 326.9 
1974/75 3 716.0 462.75 n >Hf> Ct^J . •-> 865.7 
4 572.5 341. 61 304.2 594. 1 
1975/76 ft:* 574.6 342.86 310.8 555.7 
6 255.4 139.57 143.7 255.7 
1976/77 7 274. 0 .149.73 131.1 243 . 7 
8 163»6 83.25 35.3 147.4 
1977/78 9 250.0 127.21 134. 1 r-j cr J... m i-J 
10 179.5 83.63 90.3 156.6 
1978/79 11 240.4 112-0.1 119.2 02 * S 
12 180. 9 73 „ 14 94.8 161.3 
1979/80 13 238.4 96. 39 11.6 202.8 
14 144. 1 50. 4 75. 9 .134.4 
1980/81 15 180. 3 63.07 100.3 169.7 
16 156.5 49. 34 77.6 137.5 
.1981/82 17 146.7 46.25 75.9 133.4 
18 ,128.6 37 • 39 46. 1 89.0 
1982/83- 19 181.4 52.75 75.0 138.0 
20 112. 6 29.32 50.2 77.5 
1983/84 21 155.4 40.46 67.5 114.4 108.6 13. 97 38. 3 61.8 
3 984/85 i -i rr 95.2 16.63 34. 7 67«3 
24 44. 3 6.58 16. 1 29. 3 
1985/86 25 64.6 9.59 20.8 65.0' 
26 10.4 24.0 
1986/87 r-y / 9.4 29.6 
28 6. 1 15.6 
si7"odd-numberfed phases refer to wet cropping season? 
even numbered, to dry 'season. 
Source: National Agriculture and Fishery Council. 
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Table 15 
AVERAGE RATIO OF AGRICULTURAL LOANS OUTSTANDING TO TOTAL 
LOANS OUTSTANDING & TO NET LOANABLE FUNDS -
BY INSTITUTION 
Pre-PD 717 Post-PD 717 
(1971-74) (1978-83) 
A. Agicultural Loans Outstanding 
;o Total Loans Outstanding 
Commercial Banks 0.23 0.10 
Thrift Banks 0.07 0.15 
Rural Banks 0.95 0.88 
Specialized Government Banks 0.21 0.12 
Overall 0.26 0.14 
B. Agricultural Loans Outstanding 
to Net Loanable Funds 
Commercial Banks 0.25 0.10 
Thrift Banks 0.15 0.08 
Rural Banks 1.14 1.00 
Specialized Government Banks - 0.12 
Overall 0.27 0.14 
Source: TBAC. Agricultural Credit Study, August 1985. 
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TaDle 13 
DOMESTIC LIQUIDITY & INFLATION ftATE 
1970-86 








1970" 9387.9 1479 
1971 10493.6 11.8 21.9 
1972 11871.1 13 p 1 8.2 
1973 18063.0 a/ 13.5 £ */ 16.5 
1974 . 24242.'l 34. 2: 34.2 
1975 28885.8 19.2 6.8 
1976 35897.4 24.3 9. 2 
1977 43931.1 22.4 9. 9 
1978 51837.2 18.0 7.3 
1.979 57360.0 10. 7 16.5 
. 9 8 0 67803.2 18t 2 17.6 
.1.981 82091.3 21.1 12.4 
:i. 9S2 95268.8 16. 1 10. 2 
1 9 8 3 1 1 <S • 1 18.6 10.2 
1984 121215.2 / U 50. 4 
19 £3 5 1 u<2882 • 5 9.6 23. 1 
1986 149224.5 12 . 3 0.8 
* Data from 1970-85 came from CB Rediscount 
Policy and the Arrearages Problem <Ad Hoc 
Study Group Report), 1986. (Figures are as 
of (Snd-December. ) 
a/ Smoothed out to include deposit substi-
tutes previously excluded in the concept 
of domestic liquidity, hence, the lower 
rate (13.5V. instead of 52.2). 
Sources: 
1. DER-Domestic and Dept. of Loans and Cre-
dit, Central Bank of the Philippines. 
2. NEDA-National Accounts Staff 
Table 14 
TOTAL LOANS OUTSTANDING OF BANKS a/ 
1970-87 
(fimwrit.5 in PM) 





1970 13513.1 16504.0 
1771 16023.2 17147.2 18.53 3.90 
1972 18490.3 18490.3 15.40 7.83 
1973 23235.3 19671.7 25.66 6,39 
1974 33527.0 21668.5 44.29 10. 15 
1975 43665.3 26054.6 30.24 20 . 24 
1976 52643.0 28767.3 20.56 10. 41 
1977 63197.3 32157.6 20.05 11. 79 
1978 80986.3 37733.1 28. 15 17,34 
1979 103524.0 41858.4 27.83 10.93 
1980 124936.0 43701.5 20.68 4.40 
19Q1 148470.5 46806.9 18.84 7. 11 
1982 167236.7 48629.7 12.64 3.89 
1983 219617.1 57134.7 ol . 17.59 
1984 214327.2 37437.4 -2.41 -34.53 
1985 188366.1 27965.7 -12. 11 -25.30 
1986 137408.8b/ 20054.7 -27.05 -28.29 
1987c/ 149464.0 21024.3 8.77 4.84 
a/ Loans include items.in litigation and 
past due. 
b/ After the transfer of PN8' s and DBF's non--
perForming assets to the national government, 
e/ 1987 data differ in month of reporting. 
Commercial and Savings Banks: as of Aug. '87 
Thrift: Banks & SGBanks! as of July '87 
Rural Bank: as of June 1987 
Source; CB~Dept. of Eicon., Research 




PAWNSHOPS AND LENDING INVESTORS: NO. OF FIRMS, GROWTH RATE, 
REAL ASSETS & LOANS OUTSTANDING, 1984-1987 
Total Real Assets Total Real Loans 
Year 
I1U • 1 
Units Rate in Amount Growth Amount Growth 
No. (PM) Rate (X) (PM) Rate (%) 
I. Lending Investors 
1984 152 11.9 9.1 
14.3 1985 200 31 .2 13.8 16.0 10.4 
1986 300 50.0 34.6 151 .0 27.9 168.3 
1987 443 48.0 46.6 34.0 35.2 26.2 
II. Pawnshops 
1983 701 12.7 114.1 2.6 88. 1 -3.9 
1984 848 21 .0 108.3 -5.0 90.8 3.1 
1985 953 12.4 119.3 10.1 97.9 7.8 
1986 1 143 19.9 146.6 22.9 108.6 10.9 
Source of basic data: Central Bank. 
Table 14 
SUXKABY OF STUDIES INDICATING EXTENT OF 8GRR0NINS FRON FORRAL AND INFORMAL SOURCES a/ 
(In X of Total Nuaber of loans or Sorrowers) 
Credii Source (!) (J) 
Period Author/Year of Number of loans/ 
Covered Publication or Release Borrower-Respondent s Formal Informal 
1954-35 de fiuzman (1957) 2,411 loans 12.0 88.0 
1957-58 Gapud (19581 254 Idaps 10.0 90.0 
1957-58 Sacay (1941) 914 loans 13.0 87,0 
1940-41 SCS (19635 1,479,000 loans .7.8 92.2 
1967-70 Kangafcas (1975) 151 borrowers 11.9 88,1 
1970-71 Nangahas (19751 297 borrowers 20.9 79.1 
1949-70 Alaario (1970) 138 loans T •* jiti 42.3 
1949-70 Sal apt (1974) 134 borrowers 21.6 78,4 
1973 DA (1974) 420 loans ct 7 J J * J 48.7 
1973-74 PCARR-BAEcon (1974) 3,304 loans 92.2 b/ 7.8 
1974 Cigaral (197?) 421 borrowers 94.0 4,0 
1975-76 DA 
Iloilo (Feb'. 1977) 341 loans 82.7 17.3 
Ilocos (Jan. 1977} 703 loans 47.6 32.4 
Zaiboanga (Apr, 1977} 551 loans 74.4 25.4 
1976 DA U9745 248 farmers 17,2 82.8 
1977 UP8RF (19775 1,079 loans 34.9 43.1 
1977 3A 11977J 405 farmers 5.2 94.8 
1977 TSAC (19735 454 borrowers 25.8 74.2 
1977-73 laopao & Latorre (1979) 41 fishermen 29.3 70.7 
1978 DA (1978) 338 farmers 3.8 94.2 
1973 TSAC (1981} 2,110 loans 17.4 82.6 
197? Nanalo (1979} 203 cattle 
raisers 
54.7 45.3 
1979-80 NIA-SSV (19805 299 farmers 20.0 80.0 
1980 Capistrano (19825 41 village 2.1 a 97.9 c/ 
1981-82 
households 
TSAC (1986} 871,600 loans 40.2 59.8 
626,300 farmers 34,0 58.7 




448 loans 8.0 92,0 
Credit Source tZ) <Z> 
Period Author/Year of Huaber of Loans/ 
Covered Publication or Release Borrower-Respondente Foraal Inforaal Hixed 




1985 «EDA <19871 381,400 e/ 20.7 79.3 
1984 Ateneo-Social 9.583 H persons 32.1 64.9 3.0 
Weather Stations of voting 
age 
1987 -do- 10.322 « persons 28.4 45.7 5.9 
of voting 
age 
3/ Data coaparability is liaited by differences in sailing. 
bl Saaples sere drawn froa list of borrowers of bants which explains the high percentage 
of loans frca the foraal sector, 
c/ Out of 48 responses. Soae borrowers had tore than one source of credit, 
d/ The respondents were all borrowers. 
e/ Borrowers-respondents availed of credit anytiae frBa 1975 to 1985. 
S = aiHion 
Sources; 
1. Adapted froa; Sacay, Agabin, i TanchBco. Stall Faraer Credit Dilesa*, 1985. 
2. Ateneo-SKS. Oct. 1986 i Oct. 1987 Survey data. 
3. Capistrano, Ana Doris «, "Study of A Village Econoayi The Case of Vlllarica, Pantabangan, 
ttoeva Ed is.* fi.3. thesis, U.P. at Los Banos, 1982'. 
4. Floro, Sagrario L. "Credit Relations and Harfcet Interlinkage in Philippine Agriculture." 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1986. 
5. Laopao, Hanuel and Latorre, Estrella. Saall-Scale Fishing in Leyte Province*. A Socio-EconBaic 
Survey. Econoaics Research Report, BAEcon, Series (to. 8, October 1979. 
6. tonalo, Leonardo. "Credit Prograa for Cattle Raisers in Cagayan Valley," Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Centre Escolar University, 1979. 
7. NEDA. "A Study on Sovernaent Assistance to Lew-Incoae groups with Inadequate Access to 
Institutional Credit, 1985." 1987. 
S. UP JSSI, "Financial Factors and Saall and todiua Industries in the Philippines.* 1985. 
'9. TSAC. A Study on the Inforaal Rural Financial flarkets in Three Seletted Provinces of the 
Philippines, ftanila, 1981. 
Table 17 
History of Rural Honey Lenders, by Major Occupation 
1967, 1972, & 1978 
Total No. Money Lending a/ Entrants Between 
Type of Money No. of (as of Year Indicated) 
Lender Respondents 1968 & '72 1973 & '78 
1967 1972 1978 
Farmer 62 13.0 37.0 62.0 24.0 12.0 
(21.0) (60.5) (100.0)b/ (38.0) [19.0) 
.Landlord 24 5.0 14.7 24.0 9.0 5.0 
(20.8) (58.3) (100.0)b/ (37.5) (21.0) 
Palay Trader 32 7.0 14.7 32.0 7.0 11.0 
(21.8) (43.7) (100.0)b/ (22.0) (34.4) 
Rice Mi 1lsr 10 None 2.0 10.0 2.0 8.0 
(20.0) (100.0)b/ (22.0) (80.0) 
Input Dealer 13 5.0 8.0 13.0 3.0 0.0 
(38.5) (61.5) (100.0)b/ (23.0) 
All c/ 30.0 75.0 141 .0 45.0 36.0 
(21 .0) (53.0) (100.0) (32.0) (26.0) 
a/ Figures in parentheses are in percent of 1978 number, 
b/ The balance between the 1978 total number minus the numbers 
in 1967 and 1972, were entrants between 1972 and 1978. 
c/ Excluding storeowners. 
Source: Derived,from TBAC. A Study on the Informal Rural Financial Markets in 
Three Selected Provinces of the Philippines, Table 62, p. 90, 1981, 
Table 14 
AVERAGE ANNUAL INTEREST RATE ON INFORMAL LOANS 
VARIOUS YEARS 
Interest Ratfe (X p.a.) 
Period Author/Agency Survey A. Including B. Excluding 
Covered Areas zero interest zero interest 
loans loans 
1957-58 Gapud Nueva Ecija 98.0 a/ 126.8 a / 
1957-58 Sacay 18 provinces 82.0 a/ 
1978-79 TBAC Bulacan 32.6 a/ 57.7 b / 
Camarines Sur 50.7 a/ 80.5 b / 
Isabela 83.3 a/ 87.7 b / 







1981-82 TBAC Nationwide 48.2 a/ 76.1 a/ 
1983-84 e/ Floro Cagayan, Nueva 
Ecija, Iloilo 
Marginal area fj 
unlinked loans 
linked loans 







aI Interest rates on fully paid loans. 
b/ Including traditional credit only, in contrast to figures on left which include 
traditional loans, 'legal" type of informal credit and non-commercial loans, 
c/ The study mas conducted in two areas: the control area and 
rates computed for this table came from the control area only, 
d/ Loan rates are for the wet season only, based on monthly rates of 7.6, 8.7, and 
5:6 per cent for the respective farm sizes, 
e/ Met season only. 
f/ The researcher classified the 14 sample villages into two groups. The developed 
area is more productive, capital-intensive, and commercialired than the 
marginal area. 
g/ Based from monthly rates of 19.2, 17.7, 14.4, and 16.5 per cent, respectively. 
Sources: 
1. Floro, Sagrario. "Market' Interlinkage in Philippine Agriculture." Ph.D. 
dissertation, Stanford University,. 1986. 
2. Gapud, Jose P. 'Financing Lowland Rice Farming in Selected Barrios in Hunoz, 
Nueva Ecija, 1957-58" Unpublished B.S, thesis, University of the Philip-
pines at Los Banos, 1958. 
3. Sacay, Orlando J. "An Analysis of the Crop Loan Program of the Agricultural 
Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration" Unpublished M.S. thesis, 
Cornell University, September 1961. 
4. Swaminathan, Nadhura. 'The Study on the Credit Behavior of Farm Families in 
Nueva Ecija." IRRI Ag. Econ. paper No. 82-27. 
5. TBAC, A Study on the Informal Rural Financial Markets in Three Selected Provinces 
of the Philippines. Manila, .1.981. 
6. TBAC. "Small Farm Indebtedness, 1981-82." Draft Report. Manila, February 1984. 
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FIGURE 4, Outstanding Rediscounts, 
Nominal & Real Values, 1970-1986 
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FIGURE 5. Annua! Grouth Rate, Nominal 
& Real Values, Outstanding Rediscounts 
1970-1986 
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Fig, 6, AMOUNT OF LOANS GRANTED, NO, OF 
FARMER-BORROWERS, & HECTARAGE FINANCED 
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Fig, 6H= MAS'AGANA 99 PROGRAM NOMINAL & 
REAL VALUES OF LOANS GRANTED 
Phases 1-25 <CY 1973-86) 
jiufHir M I 
1 4 }£, j g 2 0 2 2 2 4 ' 
r r - -
r i ic:t>fc" 
Fig, 7, NOMINAL RERL VALUES, TOTAL 




Fig. 7fl» ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF NOMINRL 
& RERL VALUES, TOTRL LORNS OUTSTANDING 
OF DEPOSIT MONEY' BANKS, 1971-86 
Fig, 8. RfiTlOS TO GNF OF BftLRNCE OF 
PAYMENTS, CURRENT ACCOUNT BRLRMCE, RND 
BUDGET SURPLUS/DEFICITS, 1970-86 
^er cent 
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Fig. 9. GNP GROUTH RflTE & INFLATION RfiTE 
1970-1986 
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